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ABSTRACT
How do individual qualities of interest groups and group interactions influence
public policy through the courts? This research is grounded in two primary assump-
tions: 1) neither are all amicus briefs (formal tool to lobby the court) equal, nor do
amicus-filing organizations have the same attributes, and 2) the behavior of Supreme
Court justices is shaped by the qualities of actors external to the court. Through
advanced statistical techniques, and the tools of network analysis, I build on previ-
ous scholarship to provide a large-scale study of how the qualities of amicus brief
cosigners, and their interaction within their advocacy network over time, bear on
judicial politics. Making use of the total population of amicus-filling organizations to
U.S. Supreme Court cases between 1945 and 2012, chapter 1 uses a dynamic network
analysis to investigate the evolution of organizational identity and coalition behavior
of interest groups based on the issue area they advocate for. Chapter 2 investigates
the impact of the ideological composition of interest groups supporting the litigants
on the justices’ vote. Chapter 3 analyzes how decision at the agenda-setting stage
interacts with outside lobbying to influence the opinion-writing process on merit. The
results provide a more comprehensive picture a more comprehensive picture of judicial
viii
lobbying; a crucial piece in the operation of the American democracy.
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Interest Groups and Judicial Behavior on
the US Supreme Court
How and when do interest groups influence policy through the judicial branch? For the
past 50 years, amicus curiae briefs have provided a mechanism for interest groups to
influence the US Supreme Court. In addition, justices have relied on this mechanism
to acquire legal and social scientific information to supplement their knowledge on a
case. However, we know from interest group theory that not all groups are the same.
On the most basic level, some groups are organized for public-policy related goals,
while others solely serve the special interests of specific actors. In addition to their
policy goals, interest groups’ activity is shaped by their ideological leaning, the scope
of the issue(s) they advocate for, as well as a wide range of qualities such as age,
resources, and location, among others. More importantly, interest groups’ behavior
is shaped by the behavior of other’s in their advocacy network. Thus, their ability
to influence the justices’ behavior varies from one group to the next, and between
coalitions. The fact that not all groups are afforded the same possibilities to influence
public policy means that the basic tenets of democratic and representational politics
are at stake. This research provides a more comprehensive picture of how different
qualities of amicus briefs cosigners, as well as interactions within their advocacy
network overtime, bear on judicial politics.
The institutions of representational democracy create both opportunities and ob-
stacles for those trying to influence public policy outcomes. Interest groups adjust
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their behavior to institutional rules by choosing to compete or cooperate, conditional
on their particular circumstances, and characteristics. This shapes not only govern-
mental outcomes, but also the plurality of interests, and their intra-group behavior.
A central method of aggregating this plurality of interests, and a hallmark of interest
group politics is coalition formation. Whether it is based on compromise or collab-
oration, interest groups use alliances to increase their informational environment or
obtain necessary resources for lobbying. As argued by Bentley (1908) “groups are
basic units of society, to the extent that their individual behavior cannot be un-
derstood outside of their group context.” Similarly, we can argue that the efforts of
groups to lobby their policy preferences cannot be understood outside their coalition
environment.
Previous research into the behavior of amicus briefs cosigners has generated mixed
results, at best. Whether it is during the writ of certiorari phase or during the
merit process, scholars point to marked differences in access, coalition strategies and
prestige based on group qualities as well as the issues they advocate for (Caldeira and
Wright, 1990; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014; Whitford, 2003; Box-Steffensmeier,
Christenson and Hitt, 2013; Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2015). However, the
most common approach to studying judicial lobbying has been to use the number
of amicus briefs as a proxy for influence (e.g. Collins, 2008b; Kearney and Merrill,
2000). This presumes that all groups are equally capable; mainly that they have
the same organizational capacity, access and quality of argumentation. However,
justices are not oblivious to differences between interest groups and evidently have
a deep understanding of the impact of their decisions, not only on the litigants and
organized interest, but society at large. This leaves a gap in our understanding of the
characteristics of interest groups that play a role in affecting judicial behaviors and
litigation outcomes.
3
Through advanced statistical techniques, and the tools of network analysis, I build
on previous scholarship to provide a large-scale study of how different qualities of am-
icus brief cosigners, and their interaction within their advocacy network over time,
influence judicial behavior. Making use of the total population of amicus-filling orga-
nizations in U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1946 to 2012, I investigate the evolution
of organizational identity and coalition behavior based on the issue area of cases each
group advocates for. In addition, I investigate the impact of ideological composition
of interest groups in support of liberal and conservative litigants on the likelihood of a
justice’s vote for the liberal litigant. And last, I analyzes the impact of the interaction
between group composition and early decisions of the justices on the opinion writing
process on merit. The outcome of this research tells a story about representation,
beyond the numbers or information provided by interest groups. The dissertation
provides a more comprehensive picture of the intricacies of judicial lobbying over-
time.
In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of my theory of the represen-
tational value of interest group composition. I also outline the methods used to test
this theory, and then offer an overview of each chapter. I begin by introducing the
theoretical and empirical questions that underlie my dissertation project.
1.1 Representational Value: Amici Composition and Judicial
Lobbying
Since the 19th century amicus curiae briefs have been the primary mechanism of
interest group participation in the US. It is the main way for parties outside the
judicial system to communicate to the court their views about a case, in support of
the petitioner, the respondent or neither. Although for a long time it remained a
marginal form of influence in the court’s decision-making process, since the 1960s it
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was drastically transformed by the “interest group explosion” (Berry, 1997; Schlozman
and Tierney, 1986; Walker, 1991); this was a dramatic increase in the number of
amicus briefs filed on Supreme Court cases, to the point where over 85% of cases
have one or more briefs (Kearney and Merrill, 2000, p. 85). Regardless of the quality
of briefs, this immediately points to their importance as an instrument of advocacy,
as well as a cue-providing mechanism for the justices.
As interest groups compete for the attention of policymakers, and in this case the
justices, they develop patterns of competition and cooperation that determine their
organizational identity. At the heart of this identity is their ideology. Moreover, early
interest group research, finds that when it comes to deciding where to align their
demands, interest groups also define themselves in terms of specific issues (Browne,
1990). This means that as they chose their allies, organized interests find greater
value in aligning themselves with those who share their attitudes, concerns and policy
preferences. This suggests that interest groups have heterogenous capabilities that
define the way they interact, and make them more or less influential within their
network, which is key to their ability to extract their preferred policy outcomes.
Interest groups have been able to extract great benefits from all levels of govern-
ment by forming alliances (Whitford, 2016). Patterns of behavior of interest groups
are shaped, on one hand by the scope and size of the issue, and on the other hand
by the lobbying activities of other groups in the policy community (Baumgartner
and Leech, 2001). This variance in lobbying activities is consistent with previous
research, which suggests that despite the proliferation of organized advocacy in most
issue areas, some remain fairly desolate (Browne, 1990; Gray and Lowery, 1996).
While the collaborative behavior of interest groups has been well documented
in the study of other branches of government (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991;
Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Browne, 1990), it has not been widely explored in
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judicial politics, especially taking into consideration group characteristics such as
ideology, issue area, or access to resources. A few exceptions stand out. For instance,
O’Connor and Epstein (1983) find that between 1969 and 1980, conservative groups
participated in 261 Supreme Court cases as direct sponsors or amicus curiae; in
ninety eight percent of those cases they chose amicus briefs as their preferred form
of participation. This is not to say that conservatives are more likely to file amicus
briefs, since liberal interest groups employed amicus briefs in sixty one percent of
those cases. Yet, this points to the notion that group qualities, in this case ideology,
can be a determinant of cooperative behavior.
We also know that in cases where the number of amicus briefs in support of both
parties is approximately the same, the case outcome is more likely to reflect the pref-
erences of those groups that are particularly well connected and hence more powerful
within their network (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013). Therefore, al-
though the number of briefs still remains an important predictor of judicial behavior,
this shows that the quality, in addition to quantity, of amicus-filing organizations
is indeed consequential for the judicial decision-making process. In another study of
member-based amicus-filling organizations, Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2015)
illustrate how a group’s industry affiliation and issue-area focus shapes its coopera-
tive behavior. Using jointly filed amicus briefs as a measure of cooperation, the paper
examines the diverse behavior in subpopulations of interest groups. The authors find
that the issue area (religious, labor, business, political, civic and professional), in
addition to group specific characteristics, shapes interest groups’ decision to join a
coalition.
Dahl (1957, 285) wrote that “policy views dominant on the Court are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the United States.” This means that justices have an interest in issuing an opinion
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that represents those affected by the case, reducing the likelihood of reversal in the
future. Similarly, justices may feel it is particularly important to signal non-consensus
to interest groups when broad swaths of the public, multiple issue concerns, and even
powerful interests may be adversely affected by their decision.
Some legal scholars express concern over the departure from amicus briefs as an
informational tool to its use as a lobbying instrument that distorts empirical social
scientific research (Rustad and Koenig, 1993). Justice Scalia believed it to be a form
of lobbying that consistently benefits well organized interest groups versus diffuse
and poorly organized interests (Elhauge, 1991; Komesar, 1994). At the heart of
these concerns is whether and how, interest groups truly represent the interests of
the public and the extent to which they serve to influence public policy through the
court. However, judicial decision-making does not happen in a vacuum; “justices are
people who have lives outside the courts” (Devins, 2004, p. 193). In their most basic
attitudes, justices are strategic political actors, heading to their colleagues’ policy
preferences and other political actors, as well as non-party actors (Baum, 2008). But
more importantly, justices are seekers of best policy outcomes and this inevitably
involves taking into consideration public opinion. Being in touch with the preferences
of the general public protects the prestige and legitimacy of the institution as one of
the pillars of government (Baum, 2008). Hence, when justices heed to public opinion
in their decision-making process, regardless of how broad or narrow, amicus briefs
serve as the primary instrument to gauge public preferences on an issue.
As a primary mechanism of formal communication between the public and the
justices, amicus briefs provide the Supreme Court with more than just case specific
information that is not usually found in the litigants’ briefs. It presents the court with
information about which issues are important to the public, and how their decision
is likely to affect the wide variety of interests found in a pluralist society.
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1.2 Approach and Chapters Overview
This research is grounded in two primary assumptions: 1) neither all amicus briefs
(formal tool to lobby the court) are equal, nor amicus-filing organizations have the
same attributes, and 2) the behavior of Supreme Court justices is shaped by the
qualities of actors external to the court. Based on a wide range of theoretical and
empirical research, I contend that the behavior of Supreme Court justices is shaped,
not only by ideological, legal and strategic considerations (Cross, 1997; Epstein and
Knight, 1998; Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2015), but
also through the influence of actors external to the court (Baum, 2008; Collins, 2008b;
Kearney and Merrill, 2000). Despite their legalistic concerns, justices are not oblivious
to the leanings of public opinion Rosen (1995). When making their decisions, justices
also take into consideration the public’s mood about the issue argued in front of the
court. Participation of external actors as amicus curiae provides the justices with
additional information that might not be contained in the litigants’ briefs (Collins,
2004). In addition, they provide the justices with a sense of which interests support
each side of the litigation, the reasoning behind it, and how different swath of the
population might be affected by their decision.
Moreover, interest groups that lobby the Court have a wide range of experience
and reputation. For instance, resource-rich groups tend to accumulate some measure
of prestige as they become repeat players in the process of lobbying the court (Ep-
stein and Rowland, 1991). As these interest groups become experienced advocates,
they obtain higher success rates in judicial proceedings (McGuire, 1995; McAtee and
McGuire, 2007). As an extreme example, the Solicitor General is consistently the
most effective Supreme Court lobbyist, irrespective of the number of briefs (Bailey,
Kamoie and Maltzman, 2005; Deen, Ignagni and Meernik, 2003). Moreover, when
it comes to opinion writing, Corley (2008) shows that in many cases, opinions draw
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language from higher quality amicus briefs, including the Solicitor General’s briefs.
Hence, in addition to the informational value of amicus briefs, the qualities of
non-party actors have a representational value that potentially impacts the justices’
behavior. A group’s inclination to join a coalition can also be driven by the issue
at hand and the behavior of other amicus brief filers. For example, in the case of
environmental issues, Whitford (2016, 47) finds that coalitions are stable, and driven
by the need to “share information, reduce uncertainty, and broaden the member
groups’ leverage”, as they compete with opposing interests. Using abortion cases as
an empirical test, Herrnson, Shaiko and Wilcox (2005) suggest that groups chose to
cosign amicus briefs as a mere show of support, rather than an attempt to influence
case outcomes.
Research about the influence of interest groups on institutional behavior suggests
that more diverse coalitions send more credible signals to law-makers and justices
about the quality of policy proposals. This shapes both the legislative and judicial
agenda-setting process and increases the likelihood of obtaining the group’s desired
policy outcome (Phinney, 2017; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014). A group’s ability
to influence the Court is also enhanced with prestige and greater access to resources
(Collins, 2004; Simard, 2007), especially when groups have the ability to hire more
experienced council (Johnson, J.Wahlbeck and Spriggs., 2006). Evidence suggests
that centrally positioned groups within the network of amicus brief cosigners have
greater impact on the justices’ vote (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013).
Using the network position of each interest group to measure their relative power, the
authors find that in cases with an approximately equal numbers of amicus briefs filed
on behalf of litigants, a group’s power becomes an invaluable signal to the justices.
This suggests that in addition to the information contained in amicus briefs, the
composition and quality of cosigning coalitions is another important informational
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queue that serves to gauge the state of public opinion regarding a particular issue
currently before the Court (Kearney and Merrill, 2000).
To put this notion to the test, I employ a wide range of statistical techniques
including network analysis, maximum likelihood estimation, and archival research. I
use a merged dataset of the case-centered Supreme Court database (Spaeth et al.,
2018) - which contains relevant information about each case, the litigants and the
justices - and the Amicus Curiae Network Data (Box-Steffensmeier and Christen-
son, 2016). The ideology scores for all interest groups is obtained via Large-scale
estimation of interest group ideal point developed by Abi-Hassan et al. (2019). The
resulting dataset contains a measure of coalition heterogeneity at the brief level -
when a liberal group joins an average conservative coalition, and vice versa - as the
main independent variable. The dependent variable is the direction of the disposition
on the case - liberal or conservative. The model also accounts for a host of case and
court specific covariates such as the decision of the lower court, and the ideology of
the median justice. The main hypothesis is that when divergent groups jointly file a
brief, they are more likely to send a credible signal to the justices.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the coalition strategies of interest groups lobbying
the U.S. Supreme Court, specifically controlling for their expertise or lack thereof in
a specific issue area. For this, I use a merged dataset of the Spaeth et al. (2018)
justice-centered dataset, and the Amicus Curiae Network Data (Box-Steffensmeier
and Christenson, 2016). The findings of this paper add nuance to our understanding
of the different strategies interest groups pursue to shape policy through the U.S.
Supreme Court.
In Chapter 3, I argue that the nature of lobbying coalitions has an impact on the
outcome of the case. To test this hypothesis, I investigate the relationship between the
ideological composition of amicus coalitions in support of the litigants and direction
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of the vote by each U.S. Supreme Court justice. The results suggest that being
supported by an alliance rather than a solo-brief increases the chance of success for
that litigant. Moreover, when a party is supported by a more ideologically cohesive
coalition, it decreases the likelihood of a justice’s vote for that side of the litigation.
The findings of this paper present a more nuanced picture of the influence of interest
group behavior on judicial politics.
In Chapter 4, through an empirical study of Supreme Court cases between 1986
and 2012, I investigate how decision to grant or deny writ at the agenda-setting stage
affects a justices’ decision to join the majority or minority on merit. In addition, I
posit that these initial evaluations condition a justice’s interpretation of two signals
of litigant support conveyed in amicus briefs: amici heterogeneity and power. In
sum, the findings of this paper suggest a richer relationship between the internal and
external factors that influence judicial behavior then previously acknowledged.
The dissertation aims to make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the
study of interest groups and judicial behavior. While the collaborative behavior of
interest groups has been well documented in the study of the legislative branch, this
has not been widely explored in judicial politics, especially taking into consideration
group ideology and which side of the litigation they support. In an increasingly
polarized social and political landscape, it is important to understand the divergent
coalition strategies, if any, for different ideological orientations and their impact on
the production of policy. The complex set of findings in this research highlight the
importance of considering the many cues and abundance of information contained
within amicus curiae briefs. Justices do not solely weigh the number of amicus briefs
when deciding on merit, and whether to write or join a separate opinion, but also take
into account the power of the interests, the diversity of interests including ideological
diversity, as well as the issue of the case under consideration. I believe that this
11
work contributes to an important literature that would not be possible without a




Organizational Identity within the U.S.
Supreme Court Advocacy Network.
Whether, and how, interest groups truly represent the interests of the public has
been at the heart of group theory. As argued by Browne (1990, p. 478) “the gener-
alized pluralist theme is that multiple interests (either organized at the community
or national level) interacting together, both inside and outside of government, and
effectively representing all components of a specific society or, as shall be used here,
a network of decision making produce a democratic process for governing.” Hence,
advancing the values of pluralism is directly correlated with the choice of issues that
interest group representatives advocate for, a defining feature of their organizational
identity.
The decision to concentrate their efforts on one or more issues reveals more than
just a lobbying preference based on individual-level attributed of an organization. It
reveals the strategic behavior of entities attempting to exert influence in a crowded
lobbying environment constrained by their qualities, those of other groups around
them, and the current institutional environment. Previous literature suggests that
interest groups engage in strategic selection of which issues to lobby for (Browne,
1990; Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Whitford, 2003), mainly driven by cost/benefit
analysis of the likely outcome (Berry, 1977; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Hula,
1999; Hojnacki, 1998), and the institutional context surrounding the issue (Ainsworth,
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1997; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005; Hansford and Johnson, 2014). In this paper,
I investigate the shape and outcomes of this strategic behavior in the domain of
judicial politics.
Recent scholarship on the choice of interest groups to focus on a few closely related
issues or broaden their scope of influence is somewhat mixed. It is all based on the
assumption that groups have to allocate scarce resources in the most optimal way to
advance their preferred policies. On one hand, it has been found that the growing
number of actors in the advocacy market makes it difficult for any one group to
stand out (Salisbury et al., 1987; Heinz et al., 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993;
Truman, 1951). On the other hand, when groups find themselves an issue niche with
low lobbying activity, they are more likely to have substantial influence (Browne,
1990). This means that interest groups’ choices gravitate between standing out in a
crowded lobbying environment or becoming the ultimate specialists in a niche issue
area. This also means that their choice of forming alliances will be influenced by the
issue area in which they operate, and the activities of known groups around them.
In judicial politics, lobbying takes place through amicus curiae briefs, a formal
instrument allowing interest groups to express their preferences to the court (Kearney
and Merrill, 2000). Their value is not only grounded in their use as an instrument of
advocacy, but also in the valuable information they provide the courts with (Collins,
2004). There is a wealth of scholarship that points to the importance of influence in
numbers, be it by the sheer volume of information provided (Kearney and Merrill,
2000; Collins, 2004, 2008a,b), the power of those at the center of lobbying coalitions
(Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2015), or the diversity of those affected by the
court’s decision (Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014). However, we still know little about
the forces shaping amicus coalition behavior as it is influenced by their area of interest.
So, why do some issue area garner more attention than others? And what deter-
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mines a group’s choice between specialization in a niche issue area, or generalizing
their scope of interest by advocating for a broader number of issues? This chapter
investigates the distribution of interests across issue areas as it is categorized by the
U.S. Supreme Court, and how the evolution of coalition formation is shaped by the
choice of working in a niche issue area or lobbying for a broader set of issues. Through
a dynamic network analysis of amicus briefs filed in front of the U.S. Supreme Court
between 1946 and 2012, first I provide a comprehensive picture of the landscape of ju-
dicial lobbying over time, as it compares to the court’s agenda. This descriptive phase
of the study provides a comprehensive picture of the correlation between group choices
and their institutional environment, namely the evolution of the court’s docket. Sec-
ond, I analyze the evolution of interest groups’ choices between a niche behavior or
expanding to multiple issues, for the most active organizations. This also highlights
the impact of each group’s scope of interest on their coalition behavior. This research
contributes to our understanding of judicial lobbying in two ways. First, it provides
the first dynamic view of amicus-filling organizations, overtime and across issues, and
second it begins to articulate what this behavior looks like for the most active groups
within the network, and its impact on case outcome.
2.1 Organizational Identity
An organization’s identity is partially based on which issue(s) it focuses on (Browne,
1990). We know from interest group theory that not all organizations are the same.
On the most basic level, not all groups are necessarily organized for public-policy
related goals but rather to serve special interests. And even when they do serve public
interests, they still represent some faction or another. This calls into question the
democratic potential of the interest group universe (Truman, 1951; Salisbury et al.,
1987; Browne, 1990). Scholars in political science and sociology have shown that
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inequality in density and diversity puts many issues at a representational disadvantage
(Truman, 1951; Salisbury et al., 1987; Schlozman and Tierney, 1983; Browne, 1990).
As interest group behavior and pluralist theory have become closely intertwined, it
is important to investigate how interest groups’ organizational identity shapes their
lobbying and coalition strategies.
At the heart of this research lies the explanation of why some issues have more
representatives than others. Answering this question requires an inquiry into both
individual-level and population-level characteristics of the interest group universe
(Gray and Lowery, 1996). The traditional view is that interest groups join forces with
those that share a common goal and interest, and this determines group behavior and
the shape of interest coalitions. As evidenced by earlier studies, the incentive structure
of interest group mobilization suggests that an organization’s choice of issue is mainly
driven by an economic advantage (e.g. Berry, 1977; Schlozman and Tierney, 1983;
Browne, 1990). In this case, a group’s choice of issues and lobbying strategies closely
follows a cost/benefit analysis of the potential outcomes from their efforts. However,
costs and benefits do not happen in vacuum, but exist in a specific environment at
a particular time (Hansen, 1985), which exposes some of the shortcoming in these
theories. First, an economic approach suggests that where there are interests, there
must be enough incentives to induce them to join. This is somewhat circular, and
does not really explain the variation in density between policy areas. And second,
this mode of inquiry heavily relies on individual-level attributes, such as resources,
and age, which only reveals one dimension of how groups chose between issues.
The advocacy environment is affected by changes in the policy and political process
as it is shaped by the size and scope of government (Salisbury, 1992; Mueller and
Murrell, 48; Mitchell and Munger, 1991), the number of active interest organizations
(Truman, 1951; Heinz et al., 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), the level of group
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conflict within each issue area (King and Walker, 1992), and economic and social
developments shaping the diversity of interests in society (Truman, 1951; Thomas
and Hrebenar, 1990). Hence, an analysis of the mobilization of interests requires
a theory of interest group formation that takes into consideration group qualities,
and their institutional and advocacy context. Thankfully, previous studies of the
legislative branch provide many insights into the formation of interest groups and
their interaction with the political system. Inspired by the study of populations,
Gray and Lowery (1996, p. 4) build a micro-level theory of the structure of interest
group populations, as it is influenced by their institutional and political context.
According to Gray and Lowery (1996), population level dynamics, such as the
mortality rate of groups within an issue, the scope of governmental activity relevant
to certain constituencies, and the level of partisan competition determine the density
and diversity of interest communities. The study’s main finding is that we cannot
fully understand the dynamics of interest group mobilization and its impact by solely
looking at individual-level qualities. An analysis of organizational behavior requires
a mapping of the correlation between group qualities and contextual features at a
specific point in time.
A better understanding of this correlation begs an inquiry into how groups chose
an issue to advocate for, if and when they have a choice, and what type of coalitions
this choice leads them to form. The massive increase in organized interests has created
one of two scenarios, a) in an increasingly crowded environment interest groups find
it difficult to stand out, which may increase the likelihood of joining an alliance
(Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Hojnacki, 1998), or b) they find a fairly desolate
issue area and become the loudest voice for it (Browne, 1990; Hula, 1999). Which
one they chose depends on each group’s particular qualities (i.e. resources, access,
knowledge base), the behavior of other groups around them, and the institutional
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context in which they exist.
A significant contribution to understanding the distribution of lobbying activities
across issues is found in the work of Baumgartner and Leech (2001). Using the Lob-
bying Disclosure Act of 1995, the authors present the first comprehensive empirical
research of the pivoting behavior of interest groups between issue niches and more
general lobbying. As the first study to use a random sample of issues, Baumgartner
and Leech (2001) find that patterns of behavior of interest groups are shaped, on one
hand by the scope and size of the issue and on the other hand by the lobbying activ-
ities of other groups in the policy community. One of their main findings is defined
as the crowding effect, where a handful of issues concentrate the majority of lobbying
activities, while the rest of the issues present minimal activity, with the median issue
capturing the attention of fifteen interest groups.
This variance in lobbying activities is consistent with other research that suggests
that despite the proliferation of organized advocacy in some issue areas, other re-
main fairly desolate (Browne, 1990; Gray and Lowery, 1996). For instance, in a fine
grained study of lobbying activities within the agricultural domain, Browne (1990,
p. 497) shows that the behavior of interest groups is characterized by “narrow issue
orientation, minimizing issue-based interactions, and avoiding commitment within
coalitions”, behavior which is contrary to pluralist tendencies. The author argues
that as interest groups form recognizable identities they come to occupy niche is-
sue areas, and very seldom cooperate or compete with other interests. Although
there is no evidence of organized interests responding to activities of their opponents
(Hojnacki, 1998; Lowery and Brasher, 2004; Mckay and Yackee, 2007), survey-based
evidence shows that organized interests are more likely to lobby policy venues when
it is populated by opposing interests (Holyoke, 2009, 2014).
Several studies across a wide range of issues, from environmental to healthcare,
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show that although behavior within coalitions can vary across events and venues,
the general structure of coalitions follow a similar patterns (Browne, 1990; Whitford,
2003; Heaney, 2014). For instance, Whitford (2003) draws evidence from the activities
of the Group of Ten1, to show how groups form long-term stable coalitions carving
out policy niches to attract membership and funding, as well as counteracting the
efforts of opposing groups. Similarly, Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2015) find
that membership groups belonging to a wide range of industries are driven by similar
concerns such as sharing resources to form coalitions. This research shows that older
groups with bigger budgets, and greater number of employees are more likely to
become central players attracting others to join their coalition (Box-Steffensmeier
and Christenson, 2015). However, not all groups place similar value on economic,
political and social considerations, as each dimension is shaped by the particular
issues these coalitions advocate for.
In several analysis of the micro-structure of coalitions, scholars find that greater
diversity and network embeddednes increases the contribution of lobbying groups
to each particular coalition (Heaney and Leifeld, 2018; Heaney and Lorenz, 2013;
Heaney, 2014). As each group’s position within their advocacy network improves, it
increases their influence over policy. This is supported by the notion of repeat players,
where as groups gain experience, resources and prestige they become central players
in their coalitions (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2014). Hence, in addition
to interest group characteristics, the interactions between groups and the type of
coalitions that emerge, is as important to understanding group influence as much as
a group’s choice to lobby or not. Moreover, whether interest groups sort themselves
into a competitive policy venues or chose relatively isolated venues is significant to
the extent of bias in information and representation (Hansford, 2011).
1The Group of Ten is an environmentalist advocacy network consisting of representative organi-
zations in the field
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The overall tendency is that interest groups are more inclined towards narrow issue
areas with little competition, and interaction with others that share their interests
(Browne, 1990; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Hula, 1999; Hojnacki, 1998; Whitford,
2003). When it comes to lobbying the judicial branch, this behavior has only been
explored for a subset of groups, time and issues. To date we have great insight
into the macro-level determinants of interest group influence on judicial behavior.
However, there is still a gap in the literature about the micro-level incentives for
group mobilization, and how this shapes the advocacy environment overtime. In
this study, I focus on all organizations lobbying the U.S. Supreme Court between
1945 and 2012. Building on the extensive literature in legislative lobbying, I draw a
comprehensive map of interest group distribution between issue area, and the extent
to which this is influenced by the court’s agenda.
2.2 The Judicial Advocacy Environment
Interest groups develop one part of their identity by choosing which issues to advocate
for, and another through their coalition behavior (Browne, 1990). In this section, I
present a comprehensive picture of the judicial advocacy marketplace based on each
group’s choice of which issues to lobby and the court’s docket, over the span of six
decades. And in the next section I investigate how these choices impact the coalition
behavior of the most active groups lobbying the court.
To examine each group’s choices, I make use of the Amicus Curiae Network (Box-
Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2016). The network provides a measure of interaction
between interest groups based on single author or cosigner status to the U.S. Supreme
Court amicus briefs from 1946 to 2012.2 With the permission of the court and the
2This paper utilizes a loose definition of interest groups, which includes any organization that
cosigns onto an amicus brief, regardless of its primary purpose. For example, the range of orga-
nizations goes from professional associations such as the American Bar Association, to companies
like Amazon and Google, to organizations established for the sole purpose of advocacy such as the
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litigants, amicus curiae briefs can be filed in support of the petitioner, respondent
or neither (Spaeth et al., 2018). The amicus curiae network captures the complete
population of interest groups across time and issue areas.
The data used in this paper is a combination of the above mentioned amicus cu-
riae network, with the United States Supreme Court data, which provides information
about all court cases, up to the latest version released in 2018 (Spaeth et al., 2018). It
contains necessary case-related attributes such as dates, issue area, disposition, win-
ning party, and justice-related variables such as justices’ votes, opinion writing and
inter-agreements between justices. The most important variable, in addition to case
identification (number and term), is the issue area of the case as it is classified by the
Supreme Court. The database classifies issue areas under fourteen main categories:
1-Criminal Procedure, 2-Civil Rights, 3-First Amendment, 4-Due Process, 5-Privacy,
6-Attorney’s or governmental officials’ fees or compensation, 7-Unions, 8-Economic
Activity, 9-Judicial Power, 10-Federalism, 11-Interstate Relation, 12-Federal Taxa-
tion, 13-Miscellaneous, and 14-Private Law.
Since I am interested in mapping the density of interest groups by issue area, the
first step is to asses the relationship between interest groups and cases. For this, I
make use of the amicus curiae network to identify instances in which groups filed an
amicus brief, either solo or by joining other groups. Whenever two groups (nodes
represented with a circle) cosign a briefs together on a case, their relationship is
represented with an edge (a line) between the nodes. In contrast, groups that file an
amicus brief alone are considered isolates (nodes with no connection to an edge or
line). This format for presenting interactions between groups or individuals is known
as a one mode network, where all nodes are representing the same unit, in this case
interest groups. In this type of network, the issue area for each case is only available
as an attribute of the case, which in network terms is known as an edge attribute.
NAACP or the ACLU.
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As some groups cosign briefs on multiple cases that fall under different issue areas,
it is necessary to transform the case issue area into a node level attribute in order to
capture the relationship between interest groups and cases.
Following a projection, the resulting dataset is known as a bipartite network (two-
mode network)3. In this type of network, it is possible to represent the interactions
between two types of units: interest groups and the conglomerate of cases by issue
area. As shown in figure 2·1, one node type (illustrated as grey squares) are interest
groups, and the other node type (illustrated as the colored circles with numbers) are
the issue areas of all the cases for which interest groups filed amicus briefs. While
it is not possible to make accurate inferences from Figure 2·1, it is possible to see
that some issues have a greater density of organized interests than others, which
is consistent with previous studies (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Browne, 1990).
For instance, there is a high density of lobbying activity for cases dealing with civil
rights, economic activity, and first amendment questions. Moreover, given the density
of edges at the center of the graph, we can begin to infer that there is a consistent
stream of movement between issues by many of the organizations in our population
of amicus-filing organizations.
In the full network, there is a total of 12,534 groups that cosigned onto all 14 issue
areas. Table 2.1 provides a basic summary statistics about each issue area and the
overall density of interest groups within. The issue areas with the highest density of
lobbying are civil rights, economic activities, first amendment, judicial power, privacy
and criminal cases. Again, this coincides with the increase in the number of cases
addressing legal questions of this nature. However, the raw number of groups within
each area is a limited measure of density if we are not taking into consideration the
number of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court within each area. In contrast to the
3A bipartite network allows for the representation of edges between two type of nodes, but not
within either type of nodes
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Figure 2·1: Bipartite Amici Issue Network
structure of interest organizations in legislative politics, an opportunity for lobbying
on the Supreme Court is not possible until a case is taken for review. Hence, more
than in any other venue, the activities of the court are a critical constraint on the
mobilization efforts and structure of organized coalitions.
Since we are interested in the correlation between groups and cases, in figure 2·2,
I illustrate the evolution of all Supreme Court cases argued between 1946 and 2012,
classified by frequency per term and issue. At first glance, there is an evident disparity
in the number of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court under different issue areas.
The majority of cases pertain to civil rights, criminal procedure, economic activity
and judicial powers. We also observe higher frequencies in the early part of our time
series, for federal taxation, federalism, first amendment and union cases. This can be
easily explained in historical terms. During the 1960s, 70s and 80s decades, cases in
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the Supreme Court follow the evolution of the Civil Rights movement; this includes
cases in the areas of Civil Rights, Privacy and Criminal Procedure. At the most
basic level, the findings concur with similar research at the congressional level, where
the evolution of policy domains determines the availability of lobbying opportunities
(Baumgartner and Leech, 2001).
Figure 2·2: Overtime Frequency of Cases by Issue Area
Following this, I calculate the Group-Case ratio. This is a more appropriate
measure to evaluate the density within each area, as it contrasts the number of groups
with the availability of lobbying opportunities. By following this approach, the areas
with the highest concentration of lobbying activity become privacy, first amendment,
miscellaneous, federalism, and official’s compensation cases (see the ratio and ranking
by each category in the two right columns in Table 2.1). While these descriptives
provide an overview of the structure of judicial organized interests, it is static, and
does not provide a clear picture of the structure of interest organizations across and
within issue areas, and hence group identity.
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Table 2.1: Density of Issue Areas, 1945–2012
Cases Groups Group/Case
Issue Area Number Number Rank Ratio Rank
Criminal 2,052 2,194 6 1.07 12
Civil Rights 1,481 5,440 2 3.67 7
First Amendment 695 3,765 3 5.42 2
Due Process 370 1,411 8 3.81 6
Privacy 115 2,351 5 20.4 1
Official’s Compensation 112 436 10 3.89 5
Union 367 434 11 1.18 11
Economic Activity 1,766 5,498 1 3.11 8
Judicial Power 1,506 3,216 4 2.14 9
Federalism 468 1,989 7 4.25 4
Interstate Relations 99 20 13 0.20 14
Federal Taxation 316 465 9 1.47 10
Miscellaneous 23 114 12 4.96 3
Private Law 4 2 13 0.5 13
To properly assess the dynamics of organized interest activity it is critical to
have a valid and reliable measure of advocacy activity over a meaningful time span.
In Figures 2·3a and 2·3b I present the evolution of case frequency (left) and group
density (right) by issue area, over time. This reveals an uneven trend between the
number of cases taken by the court for review and the number of groups that file
amicus briefs. For instance, while the number of civil right’s cases begins to decline
in the 1980s, the number of groups remains steady, and actually begins to increase in
the 1990s. Moreover, as the court begins to decline review of economic cases in the
1990s, the frequency of group participation remains on a steady increase starting in
the 1970s throughout the present. Indeed, other salient issue areas follow a similar
trend, including criminal cases, first amendment, judicial power, and privacy.
The above findings have substantial implications for understanding the evolution
of the relationship between the court’s docket and the influence of external actors.
As the agenda of the courts is considered to be a direct reflection of the justices’ pref-
erences (Pacelle, 1991; Caldeira, 1981), these results may suggest a misalignment be-
tween what the justices consider important issues of the day, and where the advocacy
25
(a) Case Frequency by Issue Area (b) Amici Density by Issue Area
network choses to direct its attention and resources. Understanding this relationship
requires further inquiry that is outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, this
points to an important question about the extent to which the institutional context,
in this case, the court is actually responsible for an increase in lobbying activity.
2.3 Multi-Issue Groups Subnetwork
Be it to share information, reduce uncertainty, or expand their scope of influence,
interest groups have consistently formed coalitions for their own benefit and that
of their members (Whitford, 2003; Hojnacki, 1998). At the same time, despite the
benefits extracted from coalition building, interest groups seek to achieve a measure of
distinctiveness as the spokesperson for a specific issue (Browne, 1990). As it becomes
key to their survival, this, at times means working alone or only forming alliances
with a small set of groups that share their specific interests, in order to show support
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for a particular issue (Holyoke, 2014). The choice of whether to work alone or join a
coalition, and the type of coalitions joined is also determined by group identity and
the intensity of engagement within each issue area.
So, when and why do interest groups decide to sacrifice specialization and cross
issue-boundaries? And how does this impact their coalition behavior? According
to Browne (1990), there are two advantages to working in a niche issue area and
developing a strong group identity: one geared towards members or patrons as this
makes it clear what a group stands for (Berry, 1977), and the other advantageous
within relevant networks of policy makers as it gives a group something recognizable
to market (Hayes, 1981).
While the previous section provides an overview of the distribution of issues by
cases and groups over time, I am also interested in uncovering the nuances of tie
formation based on issues, and how this impacts the behavior and identity of groups.
In this section, I identify and unpack the behavior of the most active groups in
lobbying the U.S. Supreme Court. For that I extract from the network structure
those groups that have the highest rate of amicus curiae participation, and then
those groups that have consistently cosigned onto multiple issues overtime.
Isolating the subset of the most active organizations, those that have filed or
cosigned at least 3 briefs over the entire period under study, leaves only 1,898 groups.
What does the network tell us about the coalition behavior of these groups? I describe
the network with measures of density, transitivity and centralization for the overall
network and the multi-issue groups network (see Figure 2·4). The density of the
network is the number of edges divided by the number of possible edges in the graph.
This is a measure of the connectedness of the network, the actual ties between groups
versus those that are possible. The full network has a very low density of 0.002,
which suggests that interest groups filing amicus briefs are not as connected as they
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could be. In contrast, the multi-issue groups network has a density of 0.721, which
substantively means that groups are coordinating between each other regardless of
the issue area of the case.
Figure 2·4: Bipartite Network of Multi-issue Groups
The transitivity or clique measure is about indirect relationships; being a friend
of a friend also means that you are a friend. It is an expression of the extent to which
interest groups that are indirectly linked by a third group, are also directly connected
themselves. The full network has a transitivity of 0.673 and the multi-issue groups
network has a transitivity value of 0.823. While the difference between transitivity
measures is not large, it does show that there is ample opportunity for the presence
of indirect links as groups expand their scope of interest, as evidenced by an increase
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in transitivity in the multi-issue network.
The centralization of a network is provided by calculating a graph-level centrality
score based on a node-level centrality measure. It is an approximate average value
of the centrality score of all interest groups. In formal terms, it is the difference
between the minimum and mean node (group) centrality score conditional on the
number of nodes (groups) (Freeman, 1979). In the full network, the centrality scores
of most groups are very similar resulting in a general centrality of 0.021. In contrast,
the centralization of the multi-issue groups network is 0.241, which suggests that
coalitions within the network take different shapes (see issue networks in Appendix
A). This means that groups sometimes operate as part of a team, and in others take
the role of a leader.
These measures show a downward trend in network connectivity. Hence, as the
number of groups increases, the potential for sorting into coalitions decreases. More
importantly, this is evidence of a coalition behavior contrary to what is expected
based on previous studies. When it comes to issue distribution, it seems that these
groups do not concentrate their efforts into a niche area, but maintain connections
with other groups regardless of interests.
2.3.1 From Specialists to Generalist and Vice Versa
As the density of groups increases, previous studies have shown that this leads to
greater partitioning between issues (Truman, 1951; Salisbury et al., 1987; Schlozman
and Tierney, 1983; Browne, 1990). While this seems to be the case if we observe the
full network population, this is not the case for the most active groups, those that have
cosigned at the least three amicus briefs within the studied period. Yet, the network
of multi-issue groups does not reveal which groups cosign on which issues, and how
does this vary over time. Answering these questions is the first step in understanding
how groups move between issue areas, over time. In this section I analyze the behavior
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of a select number of groups with the highest rate of participation throughout the
studied period.
Table 2.2 presents the groups with the highest degree centrality within the bipar-
tite network, meaning, on average they have cosigned the highest number of briefs
with the greatest diversity of issues overtime. Not surprisingly, the American Civil
Liberties Union is leading the pack. In this case, the diverse focus of the organiza-
tion, combined with an overlap found in the legal questions presented within these
particular issues (civil rights, criminal procedure, first amendment, due process, pri-
vacy, economic activity and judicial power), serves as a fitting explanation for the
broad scope of the ACLU. This is potentially the case for other organizations such
as the National Association of Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and other
government officials’ organizations.
Table 2.2: Multi-Issue Groups
Interest Group Avg. Issues Membership Ideology
American Civil Liberties Union 3.41 Yes Liberal
National Association of Counties 2.36 Yes Conservative
United States Conference of Mayors 2.27 Yes Liberal
National League of Cities 2.26 Yes Conservative
International City/County Management Association 2.21 Yes Moderate
Council of State Governments 1.72 Yes Conservative
National Conference of State Legislatures 1.71 Yes Moderate
National Governors Association 1.50 Yes Conservative
American Jewish Committee 1.39 Yes Liberal
Washington Legal Foundation 1.38 Yes Moderate
Legal Momentum 1.36 Yes Liberal
American Association of Retired Persons 1.26 Yes Liberal
Allied Educational Foundation 1.23 Unknown Moderate
American Jewish Congress 1.21 Yes Liberal
NAACP 1.15 Yes Liberal
AFL-CIO 1.14 Yes Liberal
Ideology scores are taken from Abi-Hassan et al. (2019)
As I am interested in overtime change, in figure 2·5 I plot the average number of
issues in which the top-16 multi-issue groups participated. For each group, I present
a simple non-parametric regression of its degree centrality from 1946 to 2012. The
goal is to track the overall progress of a select number of groups to determine if there
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is a path from specialization to generalization, or vice versa.
Figure 2·5: Overtime trend of Multi-Issue Groups
Beginning in the 1960s we see some groups becoming more diverse in their inter-
ests, specifically the ACLU, American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee,
American Educational Foundation, and the NAACP. Considering the scope of inter-
ests of these groups, we can attribute this spike to the civil rights movements in the
1960s and 1970s. However, their rate of participation in a wide range of issue areas
begins to wane down in the 1990s. This is contrary to expected patterns of behavior.
Path dependence dictates that once an individual or entity invests in an activity, it
is unlikely to change course unless driven by a rupture or sudden break in the chain
of events (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
It is evident from Figure 2·5 that after a sudden spike in diversification in the
1980’s, the majority of these groups begin to narrow their scope of interest around
the 1990s. The most fitting explanation for this change is a historical event or a
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series of historical events. This requires a more detailed qualitative analysis of what
was happening in the U.S. Supreme Court, the advocacy environment, the impor-
tant issues of the day, and the political landscape. Another fitting explanation is
contagion. Considering that some of these groups have maintained dominance not
just in advocacy at Supreme Court, but advocacy in general, it is not a stretch to
assume that once they adjust their behavior, other groups would follow their lead.
However, if we follow the contagion hypothesis, we should see a similar behavior for
the rest of the multi-issue groups in our sample. This is not the case. As shown in
Figure 2·5, the black line is a non-parametric regression of the number of issues for
which all multi-issue groups cosign on. This shows that these most-active groups are
not necessarily influencing others.
But this leaves us wondering why groups of the size and scope of the ACLU
would trend towards specialization, once they have invested the resources to expand
their influence. We know from previous studies that in addition to individual-level
characteristics, group activity is also driven by contextual factors. In addition to
the political and institutional environment, the other fitting explanation would be
the advocacy environment itself. As shown in Figure ??, while the number of cases
decreases over time, the density of groups in key issue areas continues to increase.
The reversal to a niche behavior by these top multi-issue groups could be an outcome
of the growing number of groups entering the advocacy environment. As such, when
there is a low density of interest organizations, the most active groups find it easier
and more rewarding to expand their lobbying efforts. As the density in interest
population begins to rise, they strategically shift to a more focused approach.
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2.4 Discussion
From this research, it is evident that interest groups lobbying the U.S. Supreme Court
do not necessarily follow similar patterns of behavior as groups lobbying the other
two branches. This provides further support and adds nuance to research on interest
group behavior. On one hand, from the general network, it is possible to assert that
as the advocacy environment becomes increasingly crowded, interest groups chose to
sort themselves into specific issue areas, solidifying their influence in particular topics
while signaling to their members their commitment to a particular interest. On the
other hand, while this is true for the entire population of amicus-filing organization,
the behavior of longstanding interests is more nuanced.
The first part of this chapter maps what the interest group universe of the judicial
branch looks like, and more importantly, what the distribution of groups across issues
tells us about coalition behavior. While many groups exhibit a niche behavior, this
is not the case for those that have been continuously active over the entire span of
the studied period. An analysis of the network of multi-issue groups reveals that in
contrast to the full network, these groups are more likely to work with other groups,
regardless of issue area, more likely to be friends of a friends. Moreover, the multi-
issue network on average has a higher centrality, which means that there are more
groups acting as leaders.
All these conclusions hold from static perspective of the network. Yet, once I
introduce group behavior overtime, a new pattern emerges. A time-series analysis
of the network reveals that highly connected groups begin to narrow their scope
of interest beginning in the 1990s, following an expansion between early 1970s and
late 1908s. Explanations for this counterintuitive behavior range from important
political events, changes in the court’s behavior and/or changes in a group’s advocacy
environment.
33
However, further research is needed to understand how the structure of issue
networks is shaped by contextual factors. For instance, are there any particular
cases that played a role in this behavioral shift? Are some issues more conducive to
coalition formation? Moreover, when it comes to the institutional context, I wonder
if the categorization of issue areas as outlined by the court is consistent with how
interest groups identify themselves. There are certainly alternative ways to categorize
the questions in front of the court, for example more pro and anti-issues concerns:
pro-market, pro-life, pro-second amendment, anti-regulation, among others.
A future step is to explore whether these differences in trends are not necessarily a
misalignment between groups’ and the court’s priorities, but rather a misclassification
of issue areas as it pertains to the Supreme Court. For instance, classification of issues
in other venues follows a more antagonistic pattern of pro and anti-issue framing.
Using this type of framing could reveal new and interesting patterns of coalition
behavior beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s rigid classification of issue areas. The
findings of this paper add nuance to our understanding of the coalition strategies of
interest groups seeking to shape policy through the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is evident that interest groups adjust their behavior to their political, insti-
tutional and advocacy environment. While this chapter provides an important first
step to understanding the behavior of organized interest lobbying the U.S. Supreme
Court, it is limited in scope when it comes to the relationship between the structure
of interest populations and a group’s ability to influence the court. For instance, what
is the advantage or disadvantage of greater density within an issue area? It is crucial
to understand which coalition structures are more likely to influence institutional be-
havior. In this case, my arguments for the presence of such influence rests on several
assumptions about Supreme Court litigation, justices’ behavior, and interest groups
grounded in previous scholarly work.
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Chapter 3
United We Stand? Interest Groups
Ideological Cohesion and Judicial
Behavior
Decades of group theory research continue to reinforce an idea originally posited by
Arthur Bentley at the beginning of the 20th century: “society itself is nothing other
than the complexity of the groups that compose it... When the groups are adequately
stated, everything is stated” (Bentley, 1908, p. 222). While group behavior is not
the only determinant in all things political, it plays a crucial role in understanding
why individuals participate in politics and how governments make decisions, both
essential to the democratic process.
When people get involved in politics to influence governmental decision-making
they do it primarily through the formal organization of interests. In turn, the suc-
cess of organized interests in influencing public policy depends in part on the kind of
alliances they form. We cannot state the success or failure of group influence with-
out understanding its cooperative and competitive behavior. Under the democratic
ideal, all interests are given similar opportunities to advocate their preferred outcome.
However, we know that interest groups are widely diverse. They command different
levels of resources, access and prestige, and they have a wide range of ideological
preferences. As groups can influence the political and policy processes differently,
it is important that we understand how the interactions and diversity of interests
influence institutional behavior.
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There is a longstanding scholarship around the collaborative lobbying strategies of
interests, especially in legislative politics. Some scholars have focused on the use and
biases in collaborative strategies (Schlozman and Tierney, 1983; Schlozman, 1984; Sal-
isbury, 1984; Baumgartner et al., 2009), while others have investigated the conditions
under which coalitions form (Hojnacki, 1997; Holyoke, 2011; Mahoney, 2007; Mahoney
and Baumgartner, 2004; Fischer, 2014), and the behavior of groups within coalitions
(Salisbury et al., 1987; Hojnacki, 1998; Hula, 1999). More recent literature provides
great insight into how these collaborative strategies can influence institutional behav-
ior (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015; Hojnacki et al., 2012; Smith, 1995; Nelson and
Yackee, 2012). Although the scholarship on coalition building is quite extensive, we
still know little about the coalition structure of the judicial lobby, and its impact on
the court’s decision-making process.
In the courts, interest group alliances take the form of amicus briefs: a formal
instrument used by organized interests to influence the court’s agenda-setting and
the development of law through the outcome on merit (Caldeira and Wright, 1988;
Collins, 2004, 2008a). Whether to serve special interests or the public in general,
interest groups have consistently used amicus curiae briefs to shape policy through
the courts. Scrutinized for their informational value, amicus briefs provide the court
with original social scientific and legal information not contained in the litigants
briefs (Collins, 2008a). However, participation in amicus briefs not only determines
the type of information provided, but also signals to the court who will be affected
by the outcome of the case.
Extensive research shows that Supreme Court justices are not oblivious to public
preferences communicated through amicus briefs and evidently have a deep under-
standing of the impact of their decisions on these different groups. More importantly,
the court has an interest in preserving its legitimacy as a non-political, non-partisan
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institution (Baum, 1998; Clark, 2011).
Given the openness of the court to amici participation, interest groups have also
become increasingly aware of the benefits of using amicus briefs as a cost-effective
mechanism to influence the justices’ vote and the policy established by their decision
through the opinions of the court. However, in most cases – to be more precise 85%
– groups sort themselves along ideological lines on opposing sides of the litigation.
Hansford (2011, p. 754) notes that ”the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal system
leads to a clearer sorting of interests into general ideological camps than occurs at
other policy venues.” Hence, the rare instances where ideological competitors join
forces are expected to be noticed by the justices. Grounded in previous research
on the influence of amicus briefs (Kearney and Merrill, 2000; Collins, 2004, 2008a),
and theories of diverse coalitions (Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014; Phinney, 2017),
I contend that in addition to increasing the informational environment, the coali-
tion behavior of amicus-filing organizations creates a representation added value that
influences judicial behavior.
In this paper, I investigate the prevalence of cohesive coalitions of amici organi-
zations at the case level, and its impact on the likelihood of a liberal vote by the
justices. Based on previous literature about signal credibility, and our knowledge on
judicial behavior, I expect justices to be less likely to cast a vote for a litigant, when
said litigant is supported by a more cohesive coalition. To test this hypothesis, I use a
dataset containing relevant variables about the behavior of each individual justice and
each case (from the U.S. Supreme Court database) (Spaeth et al., 2018), the qualities
of amicus-filing organizations (from the Amicus Curiae Network (Box-Steffensmeier
and Christenson, 2016), and the IGNet ideal scores (Abi-Hassan et al., 2019)). The
findings of this paper further our understanding of how justices not only respond to
the information brought by external forces, but also the characteristics of public and
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private actors.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. In the field of interest groups, it
advances our knowledge of the conditions under which organized interests are more
likely to influence public policy in a formalized setting absent the bargaining and
negotiation present in other political venues. Second, it adds more nuance to the
determinants of judicial behavior, under different conditions of lobbying. And third,
from a methodological perspective, it provides the first test in the application of a
novel interest groups ideal point estimate, the most extensive to date. The pluralist
theme is premised under the assumption of equal representation from the govern-
mental process, and equal resources and access for the variety of interests in society.
Considering that this premise does not hold in practice, this research adds more nu-
ances to understanding the conditions under which coalition behavior exacerbates or
ameliorates inequalities in representation.
3.1 Theories of Interest Group Coalitions
Decades of research into the centrality of interest groups in the policy-making process
(Bentley, 1908; Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952) “gave rise to a normative debate about
the meaning of a vigorous group process for democratic governance” (Schlozman
and Tierney, 1983, p. 352). One overarching view is that group dynamics enhance
mechanisms of representation (Schlozman, 1984). An opposite view suggests that a
quintessential feature of group behavior is that substantial portions of the population
are left out (Schattschneider, 1960). Whether one subscribes to the first or the latter
view, this is an important debate that is at the heart democratic politics.
The institutions of representative democracy create both opportunities and obsta-
cles for those trying to influence public policy outcomes. Organized interests adjust
their behavior to institutional rules, conditional on their particular circumstances and
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characteristics. This shapes not only governmental outcomes, but also the plurality
of interests, and their intra-group behavior. A central method of aggregating this
plurality of interests, and a hallmark of interest groups politics is coalition formation.
Whether it is based on compromise or collaboration, interest groups use alliances to
increase their informational environment or obtain necessary resources for lobbying.
As argued by Bentley (1908) “groups are basic units of society, to the extent that
their individual behavior cannot be understood outside of their group context.” Sim-
ilarly, we can argue that the efforts of groups to lobby their policy preferences cannot
be understood outside their coalition environment.
The efforts of scholars to understand the coalition behavior of organized interests
spans all branches of government.1 A wide range of studies provide much needed
insight into the increasing use of collaboration to lobby policy-makers (Schlozman
and Tierney, 1983; Schlozman, 1984; Salisbury, 1984; Baumgartner et al., 2009), the
determinants of coalition formation (Hojnacki, 1997; Holyoke, 2011; Mahoney, 2007;
Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004; Fischer, 2014), and group behavior within these
coalitions (Salisbury et al., 1987; Hojnacki, 1998; Hula, 1999).
For instance, in earlier studies of interest group behavior, Schlozman and Tierney
(1986) record the increasing collaborative nature of organized interests with 90% of
Washington interest groups entering into some form of coalition. In another similar
work, Salisbury et al. (1987) present one of the first systematic views of the structure
of conflicts among interest groups in different policy areas. The study shows that
while some policy areas are likely to introduce more conflict than others, in most
instances groups are more likely to find allies in their own organizational category
(Salisbury et al., 1987, p.1225). In both studies, the authors find that groups are
more likely to identify as their allies other groups within their issue or economic
1While interest groups research is quite extensive, most of the work is concentrated on those
interests the lobby the legislature.
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sector (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Salisbury et al., 1987).
More recent work has shifted attention to the lobbying activities of interest groups
as independent entities. Some of this scholarship examines each group’s estimation
of the cost-benefit of joining alliances to lobby their preferred policy in Congress
(Hojnacki, 1997). The author finds that when a group’s interest is narrow or when
allies have little to contribute, the cost of alliance formation outweighs the benefit.
In other studies, scholars investigate issue-level behavior of interest groups. They
find that as the advocacy environment becomes more crowded, groups ”cultivate
specific and recognizable identities” that puts them in a niche area (Browne, 1990;
Baumgartner et al., 2009).
However, there is a lot more work to be done to understand how the shape of
coalitions influences the behavior of policy-makers. The extent to which collaboration
has become a staple of lobbying in U.S. policymaking points the way to further
exploration, not only of the determinants of groups behavior, but also the influence
of coalition composition on policy outcomes. For instance, in her theory of diverse
coalitions, (Phinney, 2017, p.2) argues that “a coalition gains influence through its
diversity, which is defined as differences in the interest or interests that a group
represents.” Whether it is through resources or expertise, the diversity of a coalition’s
organizational members, provides more diverse information from a wide variety of
sources, which reduces uncertainty about the consequences of a policy. Combined
with the higher cost of forming a heterogenous coalition, this provides a more credible
signal to institutional actors.
In another study, Mahoney (2007) shows that decision to interest groups to form
alliances is not only driven by groups characteristics alone, but it also responds to
the institutional environment, and the nature of the issue. Similarly, the authors find
that the ability of interest groups to recruit support from legislatures is also driven by
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the structure of lobbying coalitions, and not only the resources of individual groups
as it was previously held (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015).
Other studies have found that organized interests’ ideological communities differ in
composition and capacity; conservative groups tend to have more resources at their
disposal giving them greater capacity for costly coalition formation, while liberal
groups enjoy broader support networks. To compensate for this imbalance, Hula
(1999) finds that liberal groups are more likely to seek the support of organizations
that tend be natural conservative lobbying allies (i.e. churches, business organizations,
public officials associations). While in most instances coalition formation happens
along ideological lines, we can expect interest groups as well as institutional actors to
obtain an added benefit from an ideologically diverse coalition.
This paper is situated within the literature that draws attention to the differential
influence of diverse coalitions based on the informational resources they provide to
policy makers (e.g. Phinney, 2017; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nelson and Yackee, 2012;
Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015). In judicial politics, these patterns of competition
and cooperation, the particular qualities of interest groups, and its influence on judi-
cial behavior have been explored to an even lesser degree than for legislative lobbying.
However, I go even further to argue that beyond information, diverse coalitions pro-
vide a representational resource from which public officials can evaluate the impact
of their decisions on different constituencies. This is especially crucial in a formalized
setting such as judicial lobbying, which lacks direct lobbying, and the legitimating
mechanism of popular elections.
3.1.1 Amici as Interest Groups
While originally an instrument of liberal advocacy, amicus curiae briefs have become
the main tool for public and private interests to reach the courts. This is especially
accentuated in Supreme Court litigation, where the formality and rigidity inherent
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to the litigation process requires a formal lobbying mechanism. Interest groups, early
on understood the benefits of using this cost-effective mechanism to providing much
needed information to the court, while appealing the groups’ political and policy
preferences.
There is enough evidence to show that amicus curiae briefs play an important
role in driving justice’s considerations in Supreme Court litigation (e.g. Caldeira and
Wright, 1988; Collins, 2004, 2008a; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013;
Kearney and Merrill, 2000; Hansford, 2004; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014). For
instance, the number of amicus briefs filed both on cert and merit are an important
an important predictor of the outcome of the case (Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Collins,
2004). Moreover, the number of total amicus briefs filed in a case can increase the
informational environment of the court, leading the justices to write or join separate
opinions.
In studying the influence of interest groups on the Supreme Court’s decision-
making process and justices’ behavior, most scholars have relied on the number of
amicus briefs as a proxy for influence (e.g. Collins, 2004, 2008b; Kearney and Merrill,
2000). This approach presumes that all groups are equal, mainly that they have
the same organizational capacity, access and quality of argumentation. However, we
know that this is not the case both at the writ of cert and the merit stage. While
the literature on the influence of amicus briefs on litigation outcomes and judicial
behavior is extensive, it remains in its infancy when it comes to understanding how
the particular qualities of amicus-filing organizations influence judicial behavior.
Participation of external actors as amicus curiae not only provides additional
information, but also signals to the the justices who supports which outcome, and
the reasoning behind their support. More importantly, this provides the justices with
a sense of who will be affected by their decision. Hence, beyond legalistic and strategic
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considerations (Cross, 1997; Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Epstein and Knight, 1998), we
expect the justices to take into consideration the public’s position on the issue being
argued in front of them.
At the agenda setting stage, both the number of amicus briefs (Caldeira and
Wright, 1988) as well as the ideological heterogeneity of amici coalitions (Goelzhauser
and Vouvalis, 2014) impact whether a case is granted review by both the U.S. Supreme
Court and State Supreme Courts, respectively. Goelzhauser and Vouvalis (2014) show
that the likelihood of States getting their case on the U.S. Supreme Court docket is a
function of the ideological heterogeneity of State coalitions as amicus brief cosigners.
Moreover, Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt (2013) argue that the influ-
ence of interest groups on Supreme Court cases might be better operationalized as
the groups’ relative power within its social network. Using network position to mea-
sure interest group power, the authors find that in cases with an approximately equal
numbers of amicus briefs filed on behalf of litigants, groups power becomes an in-
valuable signal to the justices. This suggests that interest groups have heterogenous
capabilities that make them more or less influential over litigation outcomes and ju-
dicial behavior. These findings deepen our understanding of how coalition structure
is correlated with the credibility of the signals as they are filtered and interpreted by
the justices. As some groups are more likely to influence public policy than others, it
is crucial to understand which coalition qualities are more likely to influence judicial
behavior.
While litigant parties extract some benefit from the information provided in ami-
cus briefs, solely using the number of briefs as a measure of influence masks underlying
qualities of the amicus-filing organizations themselves, such as ideological affiliation
(Goelzhauser and Vouvalis, 2014), and power and prestige (Box-Steffensmeier, Chris-
tenson and Hitt, 2013; McGuire, 1998), as well as the nature of the coalition itself.
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Hence, beyond their informational value, the quality of amicus-filing coalitions contain
additional signals about public preferences.
Grounded on these empirical findings and theories of institutional behavior, I
contend that the behavior of Supreme Court justices is shaped, not only by the infor-
mation provided in amicus briefs (Baum, 2008; Collins, 2008b; Kearney and Merrill,
2000), but also through the coalition behavior of actors external to the court. Justices
are not oblivious to the makeup of those advocating on behalf of public and private
interests Rosen (1995). If the number of briefs (Collins, 2004, 2008a), or the power of
groups within their network (Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013), signal
to the justices the preferences of those affected by their decision, I argue that it also
holds that the composition of amici coalitions on each case provides an additional
resource to the court about the impacts of its decision.
3.2 Amici Ideological Composition
An old latin proverb suggests that “where there is unity, there is always victory”
(Syrus, N.d.). But is there? Does forming coalitions with like-minded groups raise
our ability to influence policy outcomes? Or more specifically, in this paper, does the
ideological sorting of amicus-filing organizations into more or less cohesive coalitions
impact the likelihood of a vote for the supported litigant?
In 2002, the constitutionality of Cleveland, Ohio’s publicly funded school voucher
program was challenged in the Supreme Court. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)
brought 16 amicus briefs signed by a total of 58 interest organizations, in support
of the litigants. On both sides of the case, traditionally liberal and conservative
organizations joined forces to support and oppose school vouchers. Three fundamen-
talist Christian organizations joined forces with usually liberal Jewish organizations
in opposing school vouchers, and several black and Hispanic organizations filed briefs
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with several libertarian groups in support of Cleveland’s voucher program. In a 5-4
decision, the court ruled in favor of school vouchers.
This case illustrates two traits of judicial politics. First, although rare, court cases
can sometimes make for strange bedfellows (Lowery and Brasher, 2004, p: 238-9). In
most instances, due to the rigidity and formality of court proceeding, and the nature
of the issue, group sort themselves along ideological sides of the case. However, in
some instances, groups from both sides of the ideological spectrum join forces on the
same in support of a liberal or conservative litigant. Second, while one-vote difference
by the Supreme Court justices has become common, it is still the case that justices
come together for unanimous or close-unanimous decisions. As the composition of
the court has become more ideologically polarized, meaning that most liberal justices
vote liberal and most conservative justices vote conservative (Corely, Steigerwalt and
Ward, 2013), it is important to understand the conditions under which they are more
likely to vote against their attitudes.
My hypothesis rests on several assumptions about Supreme Court litigation, judi-
cial behavior, and interest group coalition strategies. First, justice are seekers of the
best policy outcome possible and this inevitably involves knowing which way public
opinion leans. Second, justices care about the prestige and legitimacy of the insti-
tution as one of the pillars of government (Baum, 2008). Although there is robust
evidence to show the influence of attitudinal and legal concerns (Segal and Spaeth,
2002; Cross, 1997), justices have an interest in deciding a case while taking into con-
sideration those affected by it, reducing the likelihood of it being overturned in the
future.
However, it is not always clear which way public opinion leans on a particular
issue. Hence, in a poor informational environment about public preferences, justices
are more likely to rely on the content of amicus briefs to gauge public preferences
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(Collins, 2004; Hansford, 2004). In addition to the information provided in amicus
briefs, another important cue of policy preferences is the identity of amicus-filing
organization themselves. For instance, we know that the National Rifle Association
is more likely to support conservative policies even when they are not directly related
to gun control. In contrast, having the NAACP within a coalition will always signal
a preference for liberal outcomes. Although these are extreme examples, it shows
that beyond the information provided by amicus-filling organizations, their identity,
and more specifically a group’s ideological affiliation, can serve as another cue for the
justices.
But what happens when groups from opposite ideological affiliations decide to
cosign a brief, forming an ideologically diverse coalition? Based on Phinney (2017)
theory of diverse coalitions, I argue that the presence of an ideologically diverse amici
coalition will send a stronger and more credible signal about the breadth of the public
that will be affected by the court’s decision, leading to an increase in the likelihood
of a vote for that side, hence:
H1 : Greater ideological cohesion of amicus-filing organizations in support of the
parties to the case decreases the likelihood of a successful outcome for that particular
side.
If we assume that justices are not only pursuers of the best policy outcome, but
also the guardians of the court’s legitimacy, it is possible to draw a link between
the nature of coalitions advocating on behalf of public and private interest, and
each justice’s vote on the case. This means that, while justice respond positively to
amicus-coalitions in general, homogeneously ideological coalitions might not provide
the same signal strength, as when it is coming from a coalition of groups that are
usually considered opponents.
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3.3 Ideological Cohesion within Interest Group Coalitions
This paper investigates the impact of the ideological composition of amicus-filing
coalitions on the behavior of individual justices, controlling for a wide range of factors
previously shown to influence judicial behavior (Collins, 2004, 2008a; Kearney and
Merrill, 2000). To test the main hypothesis, I use a merged data set containing the
traditional U.S. Supreme Court database (Spaeth et al., 2018), the Amicus Curiae
Network (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2016), and ideal point estimates for all
groups (Abi-Hassan et al., 2019).
The Supreme Court database, or Spaeth database as it is known, contains case
and justice-related information that spans the entire history of the U.S. Supreme
Court. It is the most extensive and widely used dataset for studies pertaining to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The latest version contains 247 covariates for each case,
which fall into main six categories.2 The Amicus Curiae Network contains all inter-
ests groups (organizations, associations and corporations) that have cosigned onto
amicus briefs on the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition to mapping all cosignatories,
the network contains attributes for most groups, including their ideological scores.
Table 3.1 presents the description of dependent and independent variables. The de-
pendent variable is the JUSTICE VOTE DIRECTION. A binary covariate, where a
conservative decision is coded as 0 and a liberal decision as 1.
To test whether the ideological composition of amicus-filing organizations has
bearing on the justices’ vote, I construct an ideological cohesion index (ICI there-
after) for interest groups supporting each side of the litigation. To construct the
2(1) identification variables (e.g., citations and docket numbers); (2) background variables (e.g.,
how the Court took jurisdiction, origin and source of the case, the reason the Court agreed to decide
it); (3) chronological variables (e.g., the date of decision, term of Court, natural court); (4) sub-
stantive variables (e.g., legal provisions, issues, direction of decision); (5) outcome variables (e.g.,
disposition of the case, winning party, formal alteration of precedent, declaration of unconstitution-
ality); and (6) voting and opinion variables (e.g., how the individual justices voted, their opinions
and interagreements).
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. Direction
Justice Vote Direction 0.497 0.499 0 1
Liberal Amici Coalition 1.470 0.779 1 3 +
Conservative Amici Coalition 1.399 0.733 1 3 −
Neutral Amici Coalition 1.147 0.495 1 3
Justice Ideology 0.008 2.222 −6.686 4.635 −
Lower Court Direction 1.464 0.522 1 3 −
Liberal Amicus Briefs 1.173 3.550 0 90 +
Conservative Amicus Briefs 1.234 4.906 0 135 −
Neutral Amicus Briefs 1.064 2.537 0 54
SG Party - Liberal 0.002 0.042 0 1 +
SG Party - Conservative 0.006 0.080 0 1 −
SG Amicus - Liberal 0.020 0.142 0 1 +
SG Amicus - Conservative 0.017 0.129 0 1 −
Party Resources - Liberal 4.359 2.757 0 10 +
Party Resources - Conservative 6.251 3.262 0 10 −
Salience to the Public 0.146 0.353 0 1 +
Legal Salience 0.925 0.263 0 1 −
ideological cohesion index for this research, I use the interest group network data
from Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2016) and the ideal point estimation for all
amicus-filing organizations from Abi-Hassan et al. (2019). As shown in Figure 3·1,
the ideological distribution of interest groups is bimodal, with a higher concentration
of groups on the liberal side.
The index used in this paper is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, often
used to characterize the distribution of interest by measuring its degree of concen-







The HHI is usually applied to calculate the market share of firms in industry,
where, MSi is the market share of the ith firm in an industry comprising n firms.
In this case, the marketplace is the brief, and the units (or groups in this case) exist




i=1(MSi) = 1, then 1/n ≥ HHI ≥ 1. In the context of measuring
the balance of competing ideological groups on an amicus brief, the HHI applies to
a brief’s share of liberal and conservative groups. As such, the lower bound of the
cohesion index goes between 0.5 for maximum heterogeneity - equal share of liberal
and conservatives -, and 1 for total cohesion.
Figure 3·1: Ideological Distribution of All Amicus-filing Organizations
The benefit of using an adapted HHI index is that we are able to capture when a
mostly liberal coalition obtains the support of a conservative group and vice versa on
an amicus brief coalition. In the analysis that follows, I test impact of this measure
on the vote of individual justices. For that, it is necessary to aggregate the cohesion
index at the case level; I calculate the simple mean of the ideological cohesion index
for briefs supporting the liberal and conservative side of the case, respectively.
As seen in Figure 3·2 there is clear separation between briefs that have maximum
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cohesion, or 1, those that have a mix of liberal/conservative groups, at 0.5, and
those without any amici support, or 0. The cases that fall below the 0.5 range
are all those where no amicus briefs were filed. Hence, I use a categorical design
where the variables LIBERAL IDEOLOGICAL COHESION, and CONSERVATIVE
IDEOLOGICAL COHESION take a value of 2 when all amicus-filing organization on
each side of the case are ideologically homogenous, 1 when there is at least one group
from a different ideological affiliation, and 0 otherwise. The alternative hypothesis
suggests that amicus-filing organizations send a less credible signal to the justices
when they cosign in a homogenous coalitions.
Figure 3·2: Cohesion Index Density
In addition to the main independent variables, I control for a host of cases and
justice-centered covariates previously shown to influence judicial behavior. Among
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the relevant justice-centered variables, ideology remains the strongest determinant
of judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). As such, I incorporate a measure of
JUSTICES’ IDEOLOGY developed by Martin and Quinn that ranges from negative
values for liberal justices to positive values for conservative justices (Martin and
Quinn, 2002). The dataset contains the relative ideological location for every justice
beginning in 1937 all the way through 2018. As recommended by the authors, I use
the posterior mean location as it provides an estimate for each justice’s ideal point
estimate for each Supreme Court term.
In addition to controlling for the justices’ ideology, I incorporate several case-
centered variables. The influence of the solicitor general as both, a party to the case
or amici has been well documented (Collins, 2004; McGuire, 1998; Nicholson and
Collins, 2008). Between 1953 and 2012, the Solicitor General appeared as the liberal
litigant to the case in 0.2%, and as the conservative party in 0.7% of the cases. It
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the liberal litigants in 2.1% of the cases, and for the
conservative side in 1.7% of the cases. As such, the variables SG PARTY and SG
AMICUS, for both liberal and conservative control for the support of the solicitor
general in those instances.
Based on previous research about the value of amicus briefs as an informational
tool (Collins, 2004, 2008a), I expect the number of amicus briefs filed on behalf of the
litigants to have an effect on the justices’ decision direction. Hence, I disaggregate
the total number of briefs filed on each case between those filed on each side of the
case, liberal, conservative, and neutral. Hence, the resulting covariates LIBERAL,
CONSERVATIVE , and NEUTRAL BRIEFS capture the number of amicus briefs
filed on behalf of each party, respectively.
It is well established in previous research (Caldeira and Wright, 1988) that Supreme
Court justices are reverse-minded, meaning that the court usually takes on cases that
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it intends to reverse. This is further confirmed by the fact that the petitioning party
prevails in 60% of the cases review on merit. With this in mind, we expect the di-
rection of the of LOWER COURT’S DECISION to be correlated with the outcome
of the case. I use a categorical variables with three outcomes: liberal, conservative
and unspecified, with conservative as the base category. I expect this variable to
be negative in the liberal category (Collins, 2004), interpreted as a decrease in the
likelihood of a liberal vote.
Moreover, it has long been established that party resources have an impact on
litigation outcomes (Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992; Songer, Kuersten and Ka-
heny, 2000). To account for litigants’ resources, I use the status scale developed and
used by Sheehan, Mishler and Songer (1992) and Collins (2004). It ranks resources
according to the litigants’ status under one of the following categories: 1 = poor indi-
vidual, 2 = minorities, 3 = individual, 4 = union/interest group, 5 = small business,
6 = business, 7 = corporation, 8 = local government, 9 = state government, and 10
= federal government. As such, I control LITIGANTS RESOURCES on the liberal
versus the conservative side of the case, with the expectation that greater resources
will increase the chance of success for each party.
Courts also rarely declares local, state or federal laws unconstitutional. When this
happens, it means that the case presents the justices with a more complex set of issues
that cross ideological boundaries. For this I account for the LEGAL SALIENCE of
the case, which consists of a binary variable scored 1 when the majority overruled
precedent or declared a local, state or federal law unconstitutional and 0 otherwise.
Also, this type of complexity is likely to be associated more political salience due to
the far reaching policy implications of the case. For this, I also use the SALIENCE
TO THE PUBLIC measure, which relies on whether a case appeared on the front page
of the New York Times on the day after the decision (Epstein, Segal and Johnson,
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2000). The variable is scored 1 for cases that made it to the Times and 0 otherwise.
Despite the limited nature of this variable, it is considered a useful proxy for salience
(Collins, 2008a).
3.4 Liberal v. Conservative: The Influence of Amici Coali-
tions
Given the distribution of the dependent variable, I use a logit model of a justice’s
likelihood to cast a liberal vote on the case. In order to model high correlation
between justices’ vote, I calculate clustered standard errors per case. Moreover, I
use term fixed effects to account for heterogenous effects overtime, and issue area
fixed effects to account for variation in justice response to different legal questions.
Moreover, amicus-filling organizations are more prevalent in some areas more than
others (Solowiej and Collins, 2009). This also means that some issues might be more
likely to receive the support of heterogenous coalitions, due to the non-ideological
nature of the issue itself. Hence, issue area fixed effects are coded according to
Spaeth et al. (2018) with fourteen categories.3 The minimum value of the issue area
covariate (zero) accounts for those cases where none was specified.
The estimates from the logit model are presented in Table 3.2, with results that
lend support to the alternative hypothesis. The predicted probabilities for all statis-
tically significant covariates show the magnitude of these effects in Table 3.2, holding
continuous variables at their mean, and categorical variables at their mode.
The ideological composition variable is positive for coalitions supporting liberal
litigants, and negative for those supporting the conservative side of the case. Both
variables are in the hypothesized direction, but only support for the liberal litigant is
3The Supreme Court database classifies issue areas under fourteen main categories: 1-Criminal
Procedure, 2-Civil Rights, 3-First Amendment, 4-Due Process, 5-Privacy, 6-Attorney’s or gov-
ernmental officials’ fees or compensation, 7-Unions, 8-Economic Activity, 9-Judicial Power, 10-
Federalism, 11-Interstate Relation, 12-Federal Taxation, 13-Miscellaneous, and 14-Private Law.
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statistically significant. This is to be interpreted as an increase in the likelihood of a
liberal vote by the justices, when liberal litigants are supported by both heterogenous
and cohesive amicus-filling coalition, with respect to the base: the absence of amici
support. However, in the design of these two categorical independent variables, the
main interest is in the contrast between the effect of a cohesive versus heterogenous
amici coalition, rather than the individual effect of each.
As shown in Table 3.2, the contrast in the magnitude between a heterogenous
and cohesive amici coalition is consistent with the alternative hypothesis. Being
supported by a cohesive amici coalition, decreases the likelihood of a liberal vote by
approximately a magnitude of 0.1. However, since we are working with a non-linear
model, this magnitude does not tell us what the actual effect is. For this, I calculate
the predicted probability of a liberal vote for a heterogenous vs. other, and cohesive
vs. other coalition. The results show an increase of the probability of a liberal vote,
by 8% for a heterogenous coalition and 5% for a cohesive coalition.
As shown in Figure 3·3, a change in the ideological composition of the amici
coalition supporting the liberal side, from heterogenous to cohesive is correlated with
a 3% decrease in the probability of a liberal vote, holding all other variables at
their mean (continuous variables) and their mode (binary variables). In addition to
confirming the alternative hypothesis, this also suggests an asymmetric effect of amici
support between liberal and conservative litigants. All else equal, liberals extract a
greater benefit from an ideologically heterogenous amici coalition. Before turning to
why this is the case, I provide the results for all other covariate in the model.
The results for the number of amicus briefs are in the expected direction. However,
contrary to previous findings (Collins, 2004; Kearney and Merrill, 2000), the number
of amicus briefs in support of the litigants does not have a statistically significant
effect on the outcome of the case. Moreover, there is also no statistically significant
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Heterogenous 0.323∗∗∗ (0.077) 0.08
Cohesive 0.202∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.05
Conservative Amici Coalition
Heterogenous −0.119 (0.076) —
Cohesive −0.065 (0.059) —
Neutral Amici Coalition
Heterogenous 0.227 (0.148) —
Cohesive 0.038 (0.085) —
Number of Amicus Briefs
Liberal 0.010 (0.008) —
Conservative −0.004 (0.005) —
Neutral −0.037 (0.022) —
SG Party
Liberal −0.165 (0.309) —
Conservative −0.132 (0.223) —
SG Amicus
Liberal 0.668∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.14
Conservative −0.388∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.09
Party Resources
Liberal 0.032∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.06
Conservative 0.003 (0.006) —
Lower Court Decision
Liberal −0.764∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.16
Unspecifiable −0.890∗∗ (0.304) 0.19
Salience to the Public 0.101 (0.059) —
Legal Salience −0.741∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.18





Note: Term and Issue Area fixed-effects, with Standard Errors adjusted for 7,532 case clusters
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure 3·3: Predicted Probabilities for Coalitions Supporting Liberal
Litigants
effect for the Solicitor General Party variables (SG Party), where the U.S. government
is a party to the case.
In contrast, when the solicitor general files an amicus brief on behalf of either party
it increases the likelihood of a vote for said party. Although, both Solicitor General
Amicus (SG Amicus) variables are significant and in the expected direction, there is
a slight difference in the magnitude of the coefficients. As shown by the calculated
predicted probabilities in Table 3.2, there is a 14% increase in the probability of a
liberal vote when liberals are supported by the Solicitor General, while only a 9%
decrease when conservatives are supported by the Solicitor General as an amici.
The resources of the litigants carry a similar effect to that of group cohesion. I
find a positive and statistically significant effect for liberal litigant resources, with a
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change in the probability of a liberal vote by 6% holding all other variables at their
mean and mode, respectively. There is no statistically significant effect for an increase
in resources for the conservative litigants.
In addition to qualities of amicus-filing organizations and the parties to the case,
I test case-specific variables. The decision of the lower courts has bearing on the jus-
tices’ vote. When the lower court’s decision is in the liberal direction or unspecifiable,
it decreases the likelihood of a liberal vote on the merit by 16% and 19%, respectively.
This is with respect to a conservative lower court direction as the base level. The
salience to the public covariate is positive, but not statistically significant. However,
in salient cases where either a law is declared unconstitutional or the court overturns
precedent, the likelihood of a liberal vote decreases by approximately 18%.
When we take into the consideration the outcomes of all amicus-specific and liti-
gant covariates, it is evident that overall liberal litigants are consistently more likely to
benefit from amicus brief support that conservative litigants. This asymmetric effect
can be attributed to several factors. First, in a study of advocacy patterns, Heaney
(2004) finds that interest groups with larger budgets prefer to work alone.This par-
ticular trait of liberal interest groups, may weaken the connection between liberal
advocacy and coalition-building. However, this does not necessarily mean that when
they chose to join forces with other groups, they may not extract the same benefit. In
fact, because they are less likely to resort to coalition-building as a lobbying strategy,
it may be the case that they extract greater benefit from it.
Another explanation can be drawn from the coalition formation process itself.
While both liberal and conservative place similar value on coalition building as a
lobbying strategy, liberals are more enthusiastic about coalition-building, especially
for short-terms gains. Moreover, liberal groups tend to seek support from other
organizations, especially those that tend to be natural allies for conservative lobbying
57
(churches, firms). While this is a fitting explanation, it cannot be entirely confirmed
from the current model, especially as there is no marked difference between the mean
composition of amici-coalitions supporting liberals and conservative.
A final justification for the asymmetric effect of heterogenous coalitions can be
found in the justices themselves. Considering the composition of the court has con-
tinuously moved in a conservative direction beginning with the Rehnquist court, we
can expect liberal arguments to need a greater level of support to win the vote of
the majority of the justices. The next section delves in a deeper discussion of the
interaction of justices’ ideology and amici’s ideological coalitions.
3.4.1 The Idealogical Justice
The most common frame for understanding the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court,
is through an ideologically motivated institution constrained by the policy and po-
litical preferences of the other two branches of government (Gely and Spiller, 1990;
Epstein and Knight, 1998; Segal and Spaeth, 2002), in addition to the meaning of
the law, and precedent (Cross, 1997). And yet, there is extensive evidence of influ-
ence on the justices from non-political actors. The findings of this paper not only
show that justices are partially persuaded by the informational and representational
cues provided by external actors through amicus briefs, but also that they can be
influenced differently depending on their attitudinal preferences and the ideologies of
those lobbying the court.
Today, ideological compatibility with the president is one of the most dominant
features of judicial appointments, on the high as much as lower courts. But this
was not always the case. The composition of the Supreme Court has been shifting
starting in the late 1970s from a more mixed bench - with up to five swing votes at
one time - to a more ideologically polarized court, with only one swing vote - Justice
Kennedy (Keck, 2014). At least this was the case until 2018, when Justice Kennedy
58
retired, opening a seat that was filled by a much more conservative justice, Justice
Brett Kavanaugh.
The polarization trend in the court means that liberal justices mostly cast liberal
votes and the conservative justices mostly cast conservative votes. In addition to the
general implications present for all political institutions, polarization in the Supreme
Court has broad consequences for policymaking over an extended period (Corely,
Steigerwalt and Ward, 2013). Yet, this does not mean that in certain instances justices
are not deviating from their attitudinal preferences. As evidenced in previous studies
and the findings of this paper, there are a number of factors that shape the decision-
making of the justices. In addition to institutional and case-specific variables, the
ideological composition of lobbying coalitions has an impact on each justice’s vote.
As expected, the justice ideology variable is negative and statistically significant.
This means as justices becomes more conservative, they are less likely to cast a liberal
vote. This lends further support to the widely accepted attitudinal model of judicial
behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). However, looking at the probability of a liberal
vote for the entire range of justice ideology, I find that the effect of the amici coalition
supporting the liberal litigant varies for the range of ideology of the justices, with all
other variables at their mean.
The variable for justice ideology ranges between −6.7 and 4.6 - from most liberal
to most conservative. As shown in Table 3·4 a change of two standard deviations
over the mean accounts for a 27% decrease in the probability of a liberal vote. The
difference between the most liberal (− 6.7) and the most conservative justice (4.5),
account for a 63% decrease in the probability of a liberal vote.
While the change in the probability of a liberal vote from the most liberal to the
most conservative justice is constant for both levels of amici composition, the change
between cohesive and heterogenous coalitions is not constant. For instance, as shown
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Figure 3·4: Predicted Probabilities for Justice Ideology
in Figure 3·4, a change from cohesive to heterogenous accounts for a decrease of 1% in
the probability of a liberal vote for the most liberal justice. However, it accounts for
a change of 3% for the moderate (mean) justice (as shown by the dashed horizontal
lines), and 2.5% for the most conservative justice. So where the liberal members of
the court are slightly swayed by a change in coalition composition, the bigger effect
is on the moderate to conservative justices.
Ideology remains the main predictor of judicial behavior. It is not surprising that
liberal justices are not greatly influenced by liberal actors, since they are already
likely to cast a liberal vote. However, it is curious that the same effect is not present
for coalitions supporting the conservative side of the litigation. Considering that the
court has become increasingly conservative, we can assume that conservative justices
do not need cues from those they already agree with when voting for a conservative
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side, but may be seeking additional cues from a mixed coalition when they consider
deviating from the preferred ideological stance. There are a number of additional fac-
tors that might be causing this difference in effect, such as deference to the executive,
the nature of the question in front of the court, or other idiosyncratic qualities, which
are beyond the scope of this paper.
The findings of this paper lend support to the overall notion of interest group
influence advanced by previous scholars (Collins, 2004, 2008a; Kearney and Merrill,
2000; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt, 2013). In addition to the asymme-
try found in the effect of interest group composition on the justices, based on their
ideological affiliation, I also find an asymmetric effect between the effect of amici
supporting liberal versus conservative litigants on the justices’ vote. The argument
in this section is that while the findings are consistent with the attitudinal model,
there is a difference in the persuasion power of external groups.
3.5 Discussion
The complex set of findings in the paper highlights the importance of considering
the many cues and abundance of information contained within amicus curiae briefs.
Justices do not solely weigh the number of briefs on a case when deciding how to
vote, but also take into account the power of the interests, the diversity of interests
including ideological diversity, as well as the direction of persuasion.
This chapter explored the extent to which the ideological diversity of amici sup-
porting the litigants influences a justice’s vote. To investigate the influence of coali-
tion diversity on judicial behavior, I develop a measure of ideological cohesion for
coalitions of amici supporting the litigants, modeled after the Hirfendahl-Hirschman
Index. Consistent with previous studies (Segal and Spaeth, 2002), the results suggest
that a justice’s ideology remains the main predictor of which side of the case they
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vote for. However, this is supplemented with a more fine grained analysis of how this
effect takes place on each side of the case.
Distinguishing between the composition of groups on opposing sides of the litiga-
tion provides a fine-grained focus on both the composition of interest groups and the
petitioner-respondent structure of cases before the Court. First, I find an uneven ef-
fect between liberal and conservative advocates. Second, the ideological composition
of amici has a greater effect on the vote of the moderate and conservative justices.
Hence, an inequality in the influence between liberal and conservative amici coalitions
can be an instance of the structure of coalitions themselves, and/or the ideological
composition of the court.
While the collaborative behavior of interest groups has been well documented
in other branches (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991), this is not the casein judicial
politics, especially taking into consideration group ideology and which side of the
litigation they support. In an increasingly polarized social and political landscape,
it is important to understand difference in coalition strategies, if any, for different
ideological orientations and their impact on the production of policy. For instance,
is one ideological extreme more effective than the other at lobbying for their desired
outcome? If yes, is it a matter of greater access to resources or organizational abilities?
This work also points the way to further inquiry into the relations between interest
groups. The tools and mechanisms of network analysis have the potential not only to
generate information about the diversity and power of groups, but to uncover other
underlying features about their nature and how they are able to exert influence. For
instance, amicus briefs cosigners could be represented as a communications network
that would enable scholars to trace not just the information that is assimilated by the
Court and its influence on the justices, but also how this information travels through
the network and whether it shapes the coalition strategies of interest groups. In sum,
62
we believe this work makes an important call for future research on the conditional




Downstream Effects of Granting Writ:
Judicial Agenda-Setting & Opinion
Writing
Justice Brennan once said that during the writ of certiorari process, choosing cases is
”second to none in importance.” It can be argued, that the Supreme Court’s agenda
setting power may be even more important than its decision on the merit. With the
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925 known as the Judges’ bill, the Supreme Court
was not only given the power to set its own agenda, but also the ability to shape the
nation’s political and policy agenda. Furthermore, increasing the salience of an issue
may be the the court’s most important decision when it accepts a case for review,
regardless of its decision on the merit. Yet, we know very little about the forces
shaping the write of cert process and how this spills over onto the justice’s decision
on the merit.
Studies into the process of granting writ of certiorari provide insights into the legal
considerations and strategic pursuit of best policy outcomes that frame the Court’s
decision to grant review of a case. However, to date we have limited knowledge about
how the writ process impacts the behavior of individual justices later in the process.
In particular, it is not fully understood if a justice’s decision on writ eventually
affects the decision to join the majority opinion, or if it conditions how they process
signals from external actors. As both a legal and political institution, it is crucial
to understand how the Supreme Court’s agenda setting process impacts decisions on
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the merit, and, ultimately, policy outcomes.
Supreme Court agenda-setting follows a simple binary procedure, where the Court
as an integral body decides whether to alter the status quo or not, at both the
certiorari and the merit stages. Although at first view, the certiorari process appears
simple and unanimous, it is as full of nuance as the ideology and preferences of the
justices themselves, as well as the politics that surrounds judicial decision-making
processes. Moreover, the Court maintains a level of secrecy during the agenda-setting
stage that hinders the ability of researchers to fully explore the impact of a justice’s
decision to vote in favor or against granting a writ of certiorari (Black and Boyd,
2013).
Still, previous work has uncovered evidence that justices engage in sophisticated
voting during the writ review process to maximize their preferred outcomes at the
merit stage (Caldeira, Wright and Zorn, 1999). Moreover, external actors have been
shown to influence the success of a writ application by filing amicus briefs in support
of the petitioning party (Caldeira and Wright, 1988). Motivated by these findings,
I explore the interaction of internal and external factors on the process of judicial
decision-making. As a host of groups that make their preferences known to the
Court, is a justice’s vote on cert likely to influence their behavior on merit?
Under the strategic model, justices consider factors outside of the Court when they
make decisions. Epstein and Knight (1998, p. 138-139) explain that “if the members
of the Court wish to create efficacious policy, they not only must be attentive to
institutions that govern their relations with their colleagues but also take account of
the rules that structure their interactions with external actors.” These external actors
can include Congress, the executive branch via the Solicitor General, and entities that
are not parties to the case but have significant interest in the outcome who make their
concerns and positions known by way of amicus curiae briefs.
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In this paper I test the influence of the decision of each justice at the writ stage
on their behavior later on during the merit stage. In addition, I compare the effect
of these initial evaluations at the writ stage, as it moderates the interpretation of the
signals of litigant support conveyed in amicus briefs. Overall, the aim of this paper is
to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between external factors, such
as the composition of the Court’s amici, as they influence judicial behavior from the
agenda-setting stage into the final merit procedures of the case.
4.1 Nonconsensual Behavior and Interest Groups
The outcome on the merit is not only the dichotomous result of who wins and who
loses, but also the legal policy established in the majority opinion. So, if we assume
that justices’ decision is mediated by which outcome they prefer on the merit, it is
only logical to assume that these early preferences also play into their decision to join
the majority opinion or not.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, nonconsensual behavior in the form of
separate opinions has afforded the justices the opportunity to dissent in accordance
with court norms and behaviors (Campbel, 1983). As said by Justice Alito et al.
(2009, 56), “concurrences affect the way the opinion of the Court is interpreted later.”
This means that despite a lack in precedential value, separate opinions increase the
likelihood of majority opinions being overruled in the future (Spriggs and Hansford,
2001), as well as a signal of changes in judicial doctrine (Hettinger, Lindquist and
Martinek, 2006; Scalia, 1994).
Although this form of nonconsensual behavior sometimes poses risks for the in-
stitutional legitimacy of the Court, it is still considered valuable enough (Wahlbeck,
Spriggs and Maltzman, 1999) to be undertaken on the Justices’ personal time (Gins-
burg, 1990, p.142). The importance of these opinions, as suggested by Chief Justice
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Stone (1942, 87), is that “it is some assurance to counsel and to the public that deci-
sion has not been perfunctory, which is one of the most important objects of opinion
writing.” Dissents and concurrences serve to “discipline the opinion of the Court,...
but more importantly, it is also a discipline for the individual justice who must take
a public stand” (Alito et al., 2009, 56). This same internal discipline takes place in
the service of the Court’s interaction with external actors.
Justices are seekers of the best policy outcome possible and this inevitably in-
volves knowing which way public opinion leans. Moreover, being in touch with the
preferences of the general public protects the prestige and legitimacy of the institu-
tion as one of the pillars of government (Kearney and Merrill, 2000). Hence, where
justices heed to public opinion in their decision-making process, amicus briefs serve
as the main instrument to gauge public preferences on the issue.
As such, separate opinions serve to establish a dialogue between the Courts and
the public (Bennett, 2001). As eloquently put by Sidney Ulmer (1981, p.263), while
an opinion “is a response to fact/law situations presented to the justices,” it also
serves as a “stimulus for those who read it whether by choice or necessity.” Since the
general public has limited access to the Court, the most critical part of this dialogue
happens at the level of interest groups.
Interest group models have converged around the notion that justices take into
consideration the preferences of those who have a vested interest in the case being
discussed before the Court (Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Kearney and Merrill, 2000;
Collins, 2008a,b). But why should justices care about the preferences of those who
have no legal interest in the case, especially when the Supreme Court is not subject to
elections or the legitimation mechanisms of the other two branches? On one hand, it
provides the Supreme Court with case specific information that is not usually found
in the litigants’ briefs. It presents the Court with social scientific, legal, and politi-
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cal information that could be useful to the justices in constructing their arguments
(Collins, 2004). On the other hand, it serves to gauge the state of public opinion
regarding a particular issue currently before the Court (Kearney and Merrill, 2000).
It is important to note that this information is not neutral, but meant to support
the position of petitioners, respondents or some alternative. As such, amicus curiae
briefs not only serve as a source of supplemental legal information, but also as a way
for interest groups to make their preferences known to the Court.
Although ideology remains one of the of the strongest predictors of judicial behav-
ior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002), at both the certiorari and merit stage, there is enough
evidence to support the notion that amicus curiae briefs play an important role in
driving strategic considerations as well (Caldeira and Wright, 1988; Collins, 2004,
2008a; Kearney and Merrill, 2000). An increase of over 800% in the incidence of am-
icus briefs over the past 50 years demonstrates that, at the very least, it is perceived
as a useful participatory mechanism by both interest groups and the Court (Kearney
and Merrill, 2000, 749) As the volume of amicus briefs has continued to increase, evi-
dence suggests that an increase in the total number of briefs filed by case is associated
with a greater likelihood of judicial nonconsensual behavior (Collins, 2008b).
Although, the number of briefs still remains an important predictor of success,
Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Hitt (2013) argue that the influence of interest
groups on Supreme Court cases might be better operationalized as the groups’ relative
power within its social network. In their study, they find that in cases with similar
numbers of briefs on each side, the quality of the interest group signal becomes more
relevant. Relatedly, at the agenda setting stage, Goelzhauser and Vouvalis (2014)
show that the likelihood of making it onto the Supreme Court docket is partially a
function of the ideological heterogeneity of amicus coalitions.
Moreover, evidence suggests that the composition of amici cosigners has a differ-
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ential effect on judicial behavior depending on which side of the litigation it comes
from (Abi-Hassan, Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson, 2019). Groups coalesce based
on which side of the case they support. Hence, any influence they have on the case’s
outcome, be it standing alone or as part of a coalition, has to be understood through
in-group behavior, hence petitioner versus respondents.
In sum, the literature suggests that amicus briefs filed by interest groups with
heterogenous capabilities, may be more or less influential over litigation outcomes
and judicial behavior. Thus I investigate not only whether the reasoning used by the
Court to grant writ of certiorari affects a justice’s decision, but whether the decisions
made at the agenda-setting stage influence a justice’s evaluation of litigant support
conveyed through the composition of interest groups cosigning amicus curiae briefs.
4.2 The Downstream Effect of Granting Writ
On average, each term the US Supreme Court receives thousands of applications for
writ of certiorari, of which it usually grants about a hundred. When deciding which
cases are ripe for review, the Court uses a two tiered process. First, it creates a
“discuss list”, automatically rejecting any cases that do not make the cut without
discussion or any formal record of the vote. During the second step, cases from the
discuss list are granted certiorari only when 4 out of the 9 justices votes in favor.1
While judicial behavior models suggest that justices’ decision-making process is
mainly driven by ideology and self-interest with choices based on a narrow set of
policy goals, they also show that justices are strategic in their choices and tend to
heed public opinion and their colleagues’ policy preferences (Baum, 2008). During the
1The discuss list is initially created and circulated by the Chief Justice, to which the other
justices attach a list of additional cases they think worthy of consideration during the Court’s
weekly conference meetings (Ward and Weiden, 2006). This part of the agenda-setting process is
the first time that justices deliberate and record their preferences about a case, thereafter followed
by the merit stage.
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agenda-setting process, justices engage in sophisticated voting to increase the likeli-
hood of obtaining their most preferred litigation outcome. Through a formal model
of certiorari voting during the October 1982 term, Caldeira, Wright and Zorn (1999)
show that justices are more likely to cast their vote looking towards the potential
outcome at the merit stage. In addition, justices not only vote strategically but also
form power alliances to obtain their desired outcome. In another study of judicial
behavior, Perry (1994) finds that justices that routinely win on the merit infrequently
vote to grant writ review. The conclusions drawn from these studies show that jus-
tices are not straight forward voting their ideological or policy preferences, but also
act strategically to minimize the distance between their preferred outcome and the
actual case outcome.
In addition, the overwhelming demand placed on the justices by the amount of
cases filed for review is usually minimized by a set of informational cues (Black and
Boyd, 2013). The impact of these cues stems from the information they provide and
their cost in time. Using a host of positive and negative low informational short cuts,
such as lower court dissent, reversal of the Court of first instance, an unpublished
lower court opinion, and content of the petitioner’s brief, the justices sift through all
the cases filed. Thereafter, they rely on higher informational cues, such as the Solicitor
General’s recommendations (Bailey, Kamoie and Maltzman, 2005) and amicus briefs
(Collins, 2004, 2008a) to work through the final set of cases. The high informational
value of these cues is provided through the expertise, professionalism and repeat
status of external influences over the Court (Black and Boyd, 2013).
The decision to grant writ not only produces winners and losers, but “sometimes
a public policy outcome with broad dimensions” (Ulmer, 1972, 435). While only the
final outcome of the certiorari process is public domain, a decision to grant review
and the court’s reasoning behind it have broad implications for the public. This
70
agenda-setting process generates the cases that the court uses to set national legal
policy (Black and Boyd, 2013), and as such warrants further research into its impact
on litigation outcome and judicial behavior. For instance, the cases that brought to
an end the separate but equal doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S.
537 (1896) or The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor
(570 U.S. 12-307 (2013), began with a decision of the justices to grant these issues
a space for argumentation. As such, this decision cannot be isolated from the later
decisions made by the justices on merit. As suggested by Gibbs (1955), both decisions
are on the merit, but the first judgement is tentative.
Undoubtedly, the cert process lacks the features of traditional judicial decision-
making, such as collegial deliberation, majority rule and public accountability. How-
ever, there are some jurisprudential considerations that shape the cert process; the
nature of the precedent, uniformity in federal law, and the court’s role in effecting
social change, highlight the importance of understanding the interaction of writ deci-
sions with merit stage factors, for a comprehensive understanding of judicial behavior
(Perry, 1994).
Although each justice’s vote to grant or deny certiorari is widely limited by the
secrecy and discretion that envelopes the process, we have access to this information
from the record books of some justices that become public after they retire. Moreover,
the court publishes the reason for granting review in a one-line order released in
accordance with Rule 10 of the Procedures of the U.S. Supreme Court (Cordray and
Cordray, 2004). The considerations governing the writ of certiorari review process
are partial measures of case characteristics deemed worthy of review by the Supreme
Court. In general terms, these include conflicts/confusion between courts and the
importance of the questions presented, in addition to other vague notions that do not
fall under either of the above categories. Since the recorded outcome of the reason for
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granting writ is at the court level, there is no theoretical expectation of a direct link
between the criteria under Rule 10 and the behavior of individual justices. Instead,
I use each justice’s recorded vote under each case.
Justices maintain great latitude when voting to grant a case review (Ulmer, 1972).
Based on interviews with several justices, Perry (1994, 418-9) concludes that “each
justice’s sense of what is important is shaped by each justice’s philosophy about the
court’s proper role in the judicial system and society.” Although, it is characterized
by some justices as a “feel”, it is a “feel” grounded in rule-based and strategic consid-
erations that speak of the court’s attitude towards a case that is unlikely to subside
during merit deliberations and decision-making. Once a case reaches the merit stage,
a justice makes two decisions, first whether to rule in favor of the petitioner or respon-
dent, which means joining the majority or minority, and second, how this decision
manifests in the opinion writing process.
In every case there are four choices available to each justice: join the majority,
author or join a dissenting opinion, author or join a regular concurrence, or author or
join a special concurrence. A dissenting opinion is the justice’s disagreement with both
the outcome of the case and the reasoning of the majority for reaching that outcome.
A regular concurrence is issued when the justice agrees with both the outcome of the
case and the logic behind it, but wishes to expand on the majority’s reasoning. And a
special concurrence reflects the justice’s agreement with the outcome of the case, but
not the reasoning behind it. For the justice-centered data we use the Spaeth et al.
(2015) database, which contains relevant information about each case, the parties and
each justice’s choice of opinion.
Separate opinions, be it to dissent or concur, introduce greater ambiguity into
the outcome of the case. However, each type of opinion has a different ratio of
cost/benefit attached with it. A dissenting opinion is written by the minority to
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express its disagreement with both the outcome of the case and the reasoning of the
majority for reaching that outcome. In this case, it is expected for dissenting justices
to elaborate on the reasoning of their disagreement with the majority. A regular
concurrence is issued when the justice agrees with both the outcome of the case and
the logic behind it, but wishes to expand on the majority’s reasoning. A separate
opinion is written when justices agree with the outcome of the case, but they do not
agree with the logic behind it.
Considering that regular and special concurrences only partially depart from the
majority opinion to provide additional information, justices are expected to refrain
from engaging in non-consensual behavior that would dilute the strength majority
opinion, unless they are compelled by external forces. All three outcomes carry with
it the possibility of introducing greater ambiguity into the precedent established by
the court. Hence, we expect the justices to only engage in this behavior when pro-
vided additional information, or increased pressure from diverse or powerful interests
affected by their decision. I formulate a hypothesis based on the interactive effect of
external factors moderated by the decision of each justice to grant or deny review, on
the decision of a justice to write/join a separate opinion, hence:
H1: In the presence of a heterogenous coalition or powerful actors, we expect
justices to be more likely to write/join a separate opinion, when they have voted to
grant review on writ of certiorari.
I test the effects of the decision to grant writ of certiorari on non-consensual
behavior, as it is moderated by internal factors such as a justice’s ideological distance
from the majority opinion writer, and as it is conditioned by external factors such
the composition of amici signing briefs in support of both sides of the litigation. I
expect our results to be particularly strong in the category of a salient question, as
this is expected to amplify the effects of the signals received from groups advocating
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on behalf of the parties. We reiterate that although we do not have an expectation of
different effects for groups advocating on behalf of the petitioner versus respondents,
we test the interaction effects for each side separately based on the way the advocating
coalitions form in the first place.
4.3 Processing External Cues
The judicial decision-making process goes beyond what is most evident at the litiga-
tion stage. More importantly, decisions at all stages of judicial review are in some
measure or another moderated by the influence of external actors. As such, to deepen
our understanding of the effects of the early decisions of the court on merit stage out-
comes, we explore the impact of external factors such as amici participation on opinion
writing, as it is moderated by the justices’ decision to grant/deny a petition at the
agenda-setting stage.
The dependent variable is whether each justice, excluding the majority opinion
author, wrote or joined a separate opinion during the 1986–1993 terms. In every case
there are four choices available to each justice: join the majority, author or join a
dissenting opinion, author or join a regular concurrence, or author or join a special
concurrence. A dissenting opinion is where the Justice(s) disagree with both the
outcome of the case and the reasoning of the majority for reaching that outcome. A
regular concurrence is issued when the Justice agrees with both the outcome of the
case and the logic behind it, but wishes to expand on the majority’s reasoning. And
a special concurrence reflects the justice’s agreement with the outcome of the case,
but not the reasoning behind it. The dependent variable is the binary outcome of
writing/joining a dissent or concurrence versus joining the majority opinion.
For the justice and case-centered variables I use the Spaeth et al. (2018) database,
which contains relevant information about each case, the parties and each justice’s
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choice of opinion. The Supreme Court database, or Spaeth data as it is known,
is the most extensive and widely used dataset for studies pertaining to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The latest version contains 247 covariates for each case, which fall
into main six categories. To test the influence of external actors, I construct two
measures of interest group composition derived from the amicus curiae network data
developed by Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2016), which contains information
about the amici, and amicus briefs filed in each case (see also Box-Steffensmeier and
Christenson, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson and Leavitt, 2016; Christenson
and Box-Steffensmeier, 2016).
The first measure captures group heterogeneity based on the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) of each group cosigning an amicus brief. The SIC is a system
used by the US government – as well as other countries – for the purpose of classifying
industries into four-digit codes. The digits of the SIC code provide increasing detail on
the groups membership beginning with the division, followed by major and industry.
While there are many characteristics that can be used to assess the composition
of interest groups at the case level (e.g., group size, age, or budget), we believe
an analysis based on the SIC is particularly meaningful since it captures a host of
information about what each group stands for, who they represent and how they
represent them.
As shown in the histogram in Figure 4·1, this measure contains the frequency
of unique SIC values corresponding to all the cosigners for each case. A higher
value of HETEROGENEITY means greater group diversity, which is taken as an
expression of the breadth of actors that supporting the litigants. I expect greater
group heterogeneity to increase the likelihood of a Justice’s decision to write or join
a separate opinion.
The second composition measure is a centrality score of the relative position of
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Figure 4·1: Histograms of Group SIC Heterogeneity
each interest group within the network. As shown in Figure 4·2, each group that
cosigns a brief is represented with a node (blue circle) in the network of amici. When-
ever two groups cosign an amicus brief together it is represented through an edge or
tie (grey line). The advantage of utilizing network statistics to create a composition
measure is that we are able to capture endogenous attributes based on how inter-
est groups interact with each other. For this we use Bonacich’s family of centrality
measures c(α, β), given by the parameters α and β (Bonacich, 1987).
Bonacich’s power-centrality measure is generated based on the relative status of
each group within the network (Bonacich, 1987, 1170). When β is positive, the mea-
sure acts as a conventional centrality measure where a group’s status increases as
it is more connected to other centrally positioned group; as in a communications
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network. A negative β is more adequate to measure power. Hence, the power of a
unit (node) increases as its connections to a greater number of less powerful groups
increases as well. Interest group networks do not function entirely as communication
networks, where “the amount of information available to each unit is proportional
to the amount of information available to those in which it comes in contact with”
(Bonacich, 1987, 1171). Although there are no explicit differences in the status of
groups as brief cosigners, the interest groups’ network has features that closely re-
semble a hierarchical power network due to the varying levels of access and resources
held by each groups. Therefore, I use a negative β.
In Figure 4·2, the size of each node (blue) is representative of the relative power
of each interest group within the network. Since we are interested in measuring
group characteristics at the case level, the basic measure of interest group POWER
is calculated by taking the maximum standardized value for all organizations that
cosigned on a case for each side, respectively.
To test the main hypothesis, I use the Blackmun papers (Epstein, Segal and
Spaeth, 2007) to code each justice’s direction of writ of certiorari vote. Justice Harry
A. Blackmun, appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1970 as an associate justice
until his retirement in 1994, gave his papers to the Library of Congress, where it
joined the papers of other justices and Chief justices in the Manuscript Division.
With the aid of National Science Foundation grant, Epstein, Segal and Spaeth (2007)
photographed and published documents spanning Blackmun’s twenty-four years of
service as an associate justice. The Collection contains preliminary pool memoranda2,
and docket sheets3 which specify the vote of each justice at the writ of certiorari stage.
2The cert pool is the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court manages the influx of thousand of
petitioner for writ of certiorari. Justice who chose to participate in the cert. pool receive a memo
for each case written by a single clerk
3This is a document kept by the court, which specifies all the actions taken on the case, including
how each justice voted both on cert and merit
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Figure 4·2: Cosigner Network by Group Power
The variable JUSTICE’S VOTE ON WRIT is coded as 1, when a justice refuses a
case, and 2 when a justices votes to grant a case review. As per the Rule of Four,
only those cases that gather four or more votes move on to the merit stage.
As established in Rule 10, the court also publishes the primary reason for accepting
a case for review. The REASON FOR WRIT variable contains four categories that
group similar reasons together. First, it contains a base category of all unknown
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reasons or cases that arrived to the court through means other than writ. Then
three other categories that group the criteria established in Rule 10 - Considerations
Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari. The category for all other reasons is coded as
1, the category of conflict/confusion is coded 2 (aggregates all cases granted based on
confusion, conflict or uncertainty between the Courts), and where the court seeks to
solve important questions or salient questions is coded as 4. Categorizing the reasons
for writ in this manner, allows us to separate cases in which legalistic concerns are
the main drivers in the review process, versus a societal change driven by support
or opposition of a large or powerful constituency. Certainly, this does not imply the
absence of both in the issue presented in front of the court.
Of course, other factors may affect both the presence of briefs and judicial behav-
ior. To that end, I include a number of control variables. Table 4.1 lists the summary
statistics for each variable as well as the expected direction of its relationship with
judicial opinion writing. One of the most salient factors shaping judicial behavior is
ideology (Pritchett, 1948; Schubert, 1965; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). The ideological
preferences of the majority-opinion author greatly defines the content of the majority
opinion. Therefore, a Justice’s decision to write or join a separate opinion will depend
on his/her ideological proximity to the majority opinion author. The expectation is
that an increase in the ideological distance between a justice and the majority opinion
author will increase the likelihood of a justice’s nonconsensual behavior. To calculate
the IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE, I take the absolute difference between each justice’s
and the majority opinion author’s score Martin and Quinn (2002).4 I expect positive
results for this variable as greater values reflect more ideological distance between the
justices.
Previous research has been instrumental in showing the influence of the number
4The scores are “based on a dynamic item response model with Bayesian inference and thus vary
over time” (Collins, 2008a, p.155).
79
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min. Max. Direction
Dependent Variable 9,903 0.348 0.476 0 1
Cert Reasoning 9,264 1.032 1.021 0 3 −
Justice’s Vote on Writ 6,742 0.692 0.462 0 1 −
Ideological Distance 9,264 1.355 1.026 0 3.878 +
Legal Complexity 9,264 −0.020 0.514 −0.281 3.272 +
Legal Salience 9,264 0.112 0.316 0 1 +
Salience to the Public 9,264 0.172 0.377 0 1 +
Cooperation 9,264 0.022 0.553 −1.502 1.794 −
Freshman 9,264 0.206 0.404 0 1 −
Chief Justice 9,264 0.111 0.311 0 1 −
Total Number of Amicus Briefs 9,264 2.425 3.869 0 50 +
Total Heterogeneity 9,264 1.283 1.428 0 10 +
Total Power 9,264 0.061 0.055 0 0.398 +
of amicus briefs on judicial behavior (Collins, 2008a). I include the count of amicus
curiae briefs in support of the litigants in the variable TOTAL NUMBER OF AMI-
CUS BRIEFS. This contain the total number of briefs filed per case on behalf of both
litigants. Moreover, there is evidence that when a case is legally complex, it is difficult
for the majority opinion to adequately address the variety of concerns presented by
other justices (Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman, 1999). For this, I derive a LEGAL
COMPLEXITY variable based on a factor analysis of the number of issues raised by a
case and the number of legal provisions relevant to the case, following Collins (2008a)
and Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman (1999). As suggested by Collins (2008a), the
expected sign of this variable is positive making authorship of separate opinions more
likely.
Nonconsensual behavior is also expected to be more likely in cases where the
majority overrules a precedent or declares a law unconstitutional. Due to the rarity
of the Court overruling itself (Spriggs and Hansford, 2001), I expect that when the
majority overrules a previous decision, this will increase the likelihood of a justice
writing or joining a separate opinion to signal their dissatisfaction with a violation
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of this implicit norm. Moreover, the Court also rarely declares local, state or federal
laws unconstitutional, which is also expected to lead to an increase in nonconsensual
behavior. For this an indicator of LEGAL SALIENCE is created, which consists of
a binary variable scored 1 when the majority overruled precedent or declared a local,
state or federal law unconstitutional and 0 otherwise.
In addition to case attributes and ideological concerns, there are justice specific
characteristics that influence nonconsensual behavior. Several studies have demon-
strated that newly appointed justices are less likely to engage in nonconsensual be-
havior due to acclimation issues (Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2003) and the
undeveloped state of their policy preferences (Brenner, 1983). I test this with a vari-
able labeled FRESHMAN, which scores 1 if a justice has served for less than two full
terms on the bench and 0 otherwise. The results are expected to be negatively sign,
as justices who are new to the Court will be less likely to engage in nonconsensual
behavior (Collins, 2008a). Similarly consistent with the Court’s norms of consensus,
Chief Justices are also less likely to write or join separate opinions (Wahlbeck, Spriggs
and Maltzman, 1999). The CHIEF JUSTICE variable, expected to be negative, is
scored 1 for Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, and 0 for all other justices.
Studies into judicial behavior have also pointed to the fact that justices are “partic-
ipants in a repeated game” (Murphy, 1964, p.38, Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman,
1999, p.496). As such, it is expected that past cooperation will have an effect on
whether a justice decides to write a separate opinion or join other justices in noncon-
sensual behavior. Based on past studies (Collins, 2008a), I expect a justice to be less
likely to exhibit nonconsensual behavior if he or she has cooperated with the majority
opinion author in the past. I adopt a measure of COOPERATION by calculating the
percentage of the time the majority-opinion author joined a separate opinion writ-
ten by another justice in a previous term (Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman, 1999,
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500). To account for ideological compatibility, the cooperation measure consists of
the residuals of the percentage of time the majority-opinion author joined a separate
opinion regressed on the ideological distance variable. Accordingly, the expected sign
of this variable is negative indicating that a justice is less likely to engage in noncon-
sensual behavior if he or she has cooperated with the majority-opinion author in the
past.
Past research also indicates that justices are more likely to write separate opin-
ions in salient cases (Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2004; Maltzman, Spriggs and
Wahlbeck, 2000; Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman, 1999). According to Collins, in
order to accurately measure salience, it is important to differentiate between salience
to the public and salience to the justice. I construct the SALIENCE TO THE PUB-
LIC measure following Collins (2008a), which relies on whether a case appeared on
the front page of the New York Times on the day after the decision (Epstein, Segal
and Johnson, 2000). The variable is scored 1 for cases that made it to the Times
and 0 otherwise. Despite the limited nature of this variable, it is considered a useful
proxy for salience (Collins, 2008a).
4.4 From a Tentative Merit to a Final Merit
A dependent variable containing a binary choice available to each justice (majority
or separate), requires a model that is able to estimate the effects of an independent
variable on a dichotomous dependent variable. I use a logit model to estimate the
likelihood that a justice will author or join a separate opinion, relative to the majority
opinion (base decision). I add term fixed effects and clustered standard errors for each
model, in order to account for high correlations between our variables of interest and
a justice’s choice on each case. Table 4.2 shows the results from the two models
constructed to test the stated hypothesis. Model 1 contains the lower order terms
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testing the effect of a justice’s cert vote on the likelihood of writing/joining a separate
opinion. Model 2 contains the higher order terms. It estimates the interaction effect
of coalition heterogeneity and a justice’s cert vote on the decision of a justice to
write/join a separate opinion on the merit, and the interaction effect of powerful
coalitions and a justice’s cert vote on the decision of a justice to write/join a separate
opinion on the merit. In both models I control for the number of amicus briefs filed
on behalf of the litigants.5
The results in both models 1 and 2 in Table 4.2 show a consistently negative rela-
tionship between casting a positive vote during writ of certiorari and nonconsensual
behavior. This is interpreted as a decrease in the likelihood of nonconsensual behav-
ior. Moreover, for all three categories of writ reasoning the coefficient is negative, but
only statistically significant for Other writ and Confusion/Conflict writ. However,
since I am only interested in the moderating effects of the vote on cert on the signals
conveyed through amici composition, I limit the discussion to the interaction terms
in Model 2.
The multiplicative effect of external cues is only significant in some instances.
While the number of amicus briefs has been shown to increase the likelihood of non-
consensual behavior (Collins, 2008a), the interactive effect of having voted to grant
writ renders the impact of amicus brief counts insignificant. As for the the compo-
sition of amici, the measure of heterogeneity and power provide a contrasting mod-
erating effect. On one hand, a statistically significant and positive coefficient for the
Total Heterogeneity variable suggests that as the diversity of interests supporting the
litigants increases, it also increases the likelihood of writing/joining a separate opinion
when a justice has casted a grant vote during the agenda setting stage. On the other
hand, as shown by a positive coefficient in the covariate of Total Power, the presence
5The control variables remain stable in both restricted and unrestricted models. However, best
model possible, as suggested by the decreasing AIC and Log Likelihood is Model 2 with the inter-
active terms - see Appendix C for more details.
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of powerful actors in an amici coalition decreases the likelihood of writing/joining
separate opinion when a justice has previously voted to grant writ.
Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Model for Judicial Behavior, 1986-1994
Terms
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance 0.067∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.030) (0.031)
Legal Complexity 0.189∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.093) (0.092)
Legal Salience 0.263∗∗ 0.264∗
(0.145) (0.144)






Chief Justice −0.826∗∗∗ −0.829∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.105)
Writ for Other −0.267∗∗ −0.263∗∗
(0.116) (0.116)
Writ for Conflict/Confusion −0.266∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.099)
Writ for Salient Question −0.109 −0.117
(0.152) (0.151)
Justice’s Vote on Writ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗
(0.077) (0.116)
Total Number of Amicus Briefs 0.029 0.054∗∗
(0.029) (0.023)
Total Heterogeneity −0.124 −0.388
(0.043) (0.079)
Total Power −1.537 2.006
(1.141) (1.805)
Total Number of Amicus Briefs:Justice’s Vote on Writ −0.039
(0.027)
Total Heterogeneity:Justice’s Vote on Writ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.030)




Log Likelihood −4,059 −4,053
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
Model 2: Interaction of Reason for Writ with Group Power and Heterogeneity
Standard errors adjusted for 797 clusters by case
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First, these results point to a fundamental difference in the signals communicated
by different qualities of amici coalitions. This supports the initial argument that
justices will refrain from introducing ambiguity into the outcome of the case, unless
they are compelled by a significant external cue, such as the solicitor general (Bailey,
Kamoie and Maltzman, 2005) or amicus briefs (Collins, 2008a). Moreover, not all
amici signals are the same, the cues of a diverse coalition comes from the impact
that the decision of the court will have on a wider range of interests. Hence, leading
the justices to expand on their reasoning through separate opinions. As shown in
Figure 4·3, the moderating effect of heterogeneous amici increases the likelihood of
writing a separate by approximately 30%. However, with the 95% confidence inter-
val, it is evident that this effect becomes less significant as the diversity of groups
supporting the litigants increases.
Figure 4·3: Interactive Effect of Cert Vote and Amici Heterogeneity
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Figure 4·4: Interactive Effect of Cert Vote and Amici Power
In contrast, the cues of powerful coalitions comes from the professionalism and
repeat status of amici that do not necessarily provide the court with additional in-
formation, but the sense that the stakes in the outcome of the case might be higher.
This would explain the decrease in the likelihood of separate opinions in the presence
of powerful amici. As shown in Figure 4·4, the moderating effect of powerful actors
within a coalition decreases the likelihood of writing or joining a separate opinion
by approximately 20%. Considering that regular and special concurrences only de-
part from the majority opinion to provide additional information and expand on the
logic of the majority, justices refrain from engaging in behavior that would dilute the
strength and impact of the majority opinion. This suggests, that when in the pres-
ence of powerful external cues, justices are less willing to engage in non-consensual
behavior.
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In addition to the hypothesized covariates, there are other factors at play. The
justice related covariates are consistent with previous literature. One of the strongest
predictors of judicial behavior remains the ideological standing of each justice. The
ideological distance covariate, between each justice and the majority opinion writer,
remains positively significant in all three models. Previous cooperation between jus-
tices decreases the likelihood of engaging in nonconsensual behavior, as well as being
chief justice. Being a junior justice has a negatively significant effect, but only when
it comes to dissenting.
In terms of case related covariates, the legal complexity of the case, as measured
by the number of legal provisions it refers to and issues it addresses, is not significant
in any of the models for all three nominal categories of judicial behavior. Legal
salience of the case, as measured through overturning precedent and unconstitutional
declarations, is only significant when it comes to dissents, and salience to the public
has a statistically significant effect for all categories in all three models. For the
number of briefs covariate, Model 1 is consistent with the literature (Collins, 2008a),
where the number of briefs shows a positive effect on the likelihood of nonconsensual
behavior. Yet, the effect is only significant in Model 2, which includes the interactive
effects.
4.5 Discussion
In looking at the impact of early decisions made by the Court on subsequent judicial
behavior, I find that when justices have voted to grant review during the initial stage
of the case, they have fewer incentives to introduce ambiguity into the case through
a separate opinion, unless they are compelled by the breadth of those indirectly
affected by the outcome of the case. Moreover, when justice’s disagreement with the
logic of the argument provided in the majority opinion is large enough and supported
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by powerful interests, it does not seem to warrant the effort of crafting a separate
opinion. I also find that when a case is granted review due to conflict, confusion
or uncertainty in the issue presented it decreases the likelihood of nonconsensual
behavior. This points to the fact that justices are not oblivious to the political
and policy ramification of their legal decision-making, and that the preferences and
interests of the public interact to influence judicial behavior in more than one way.
The findings in this paper confirm many of those from previous studies, but also
offer a number of novel insights. Consistent with previous literature, the greater the
ideological distance between the justice and the majority opinion writer, the greater
the likelihood of a justice’s decision to write or join a separate opinion. When it
comes to the influence of special interests before the Court, I find that all groups do
not send the same signal to the justices. Interest groups that are particularly well
connected and powerful within their networks have a greater influence on a justice’s
decision to write or join a separate opinion. Likewise, interest groups that are on the
same side of the case as interest groups from other industries send a broad signal that
justices respond to.
For interest groups, this influence is consistently present as a stand alone factor
during the merit stage. However, the effect of these factors are differently moderated
by a justice’s previous behavior at the writ stage. Finally, this paper shows that
judicial behavior at the certiorari and merit stage are not entirely independent. I
believe that this work provides an important contribution to our understanding of
judicial behavior in all its stages. This would not be possible without a fine-grained
study of the influence of each justice’s vote during the agenda-setting stage on their
decision to engage in nonconsensual behavior.
This work also point to different areas of future research. A justice’s reasoning
for granting or refusing the review of a lower court’s decision might vary greatly from
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one case to the next. For instance, a justice might vote to grant a case because they
consider the legal question ripe for review. A justice might also be influenced by
the recommendations of the Solicitor General, or the bargaining process within the
court itself. Moreover, a justice might vote to refuse cert because he/she believes
the question is not ripe to be considered by the court, or the opposite, because it is
ripe, but they do not think they can obtain their preferred outcome on the merit.
Further exploring the mechanisms connecting early decisions with a justice’s behavior
on merit is crucial to constructing a more comprehensive picture of the influence of




How and when do interest groups influence policy through the judicial branch? The
three chapters above explored the composition and density of the judicial advocacy
environment, the influence of interest group diversity on judicial behavior, and the
moderating effect of interest group composition and agenda setting decisions on ju-
dicial behavior on merit. In sum, the dissertation provides a more comprehensive
picture of the complexities interest group behavior in lobbying the judicial branch.
Before providing some concluding remarks and questions for future research, I proceed
to summarize the findings from these studies.
To test the influence of interest groups on judicial behavior, I use a combination
of descriptive and inferential methods. I utilize a merged data set containing court
relevant information, and interest group characteristics, to answer three basic ques-
tions on the relation between interest group composition and judicial behavior: 1)
Do interest groups adjust their coalition behavior contingent on the issue of interest?
2) Does the ideological composition of lobbying coalitions impact judicial behavior?
3) Does a justice’s agenda-setting behavior, influence their behavior on merit as it is
moderated by external influence?
This research begins with a mapping of the amicus brief signers’ universe, and
more importantly, what the distribution of groups across issue areas looks like. Using
the full population of amicus brief cosigners between 1945 and 2012, I configured the
network of amicus brief cosigners into a bipartite projection that allows me to observe
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group behavior by issue area. Through a descriptive analysis, this chapter shows an
uneven density of interests between issues. Moreover, there is a disparity between
the density of cases taken by the Supreme Court and the level of lobbying activity
within each issue. As the number of cases declines over time, the number of groups
continues to increase.
From this research, it is evident that interest groups lobbying the U.S. Supreme
Court do not necessarily follow similar patterns of behavior as groups lobbying the
other two branches. This provides further support and adds nuance to research on
interest group behavior. On one hand, from the general network, it is possible to assert
that as the advocacy environment becomes increasingly crowded, interest groups chose
to sort themselves into specific issue areas, solidifying their influence in particular
topics while signaling to their members their commitment to a particular interest.
On the other hand, while this is true for the majority of interest groups, those that
are consistently present in the lobbying market, become closely intertwined with other
groups, and cross issue frontiers.
In the second chapter, I explored the extent to which the ideological diversity of
amici supporting the litigants influences a justice’s vote on the case. In this study, I
created a measure of ideological cohesion for coalitions of amici supporting the liti-
gants, modeled after the Hirfendahl-Hirschman Index. Consistent with the literature,
the results of this study show that a justice’s ideology remains the main predictor of
which side of the case they vote for. However, the ideological composition of amici
has an effect on the likelihood of a vote for the liberal versus conservative litigants.
The results suggest an uneven effect of between liberal and conservative advocates,
especially as it influences the vote of the more moderate and conservative justices.
As a host of groups that make their preferences known to the Court, is a justice’s
vote on cert likely to influence their behavior on merit? In the chapter preceding
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this conclusion, I test the moderating effects of interest group composition on justices
decision to write/join a separate opinion, accounting for their vote on a writ petition
for the case. In looking at the impact of early decisions made by the Court on
subsequent judicial behavior, I find that when justices have voted to grant review
during the initial stage of the case, they have less incentives to introduce ambiguity
into the case through a separate opinion, unless they are compelled by the breadth
of those indirectly affected by the outcome of the case. Moreover, when justice’s
disagreement with the logic of the argument provided in the majority opinion is large
enough and supported by powerful interests, it does not seem to warrant the effort
of crafting a separate opinion. I also find that when a case is granted review due
to conflict, confusion or uncertainty in the issue presented it decreases the likelihood
of nonconsensual behavior. This point to the fact that justices are not oblivious
to the political and policy ramification of their legal decision-making, and that the
preferences and interests of the public interact and influence judicial behavior in more
than one way.
The conclusions drawn from this dissertation confirm existing notions about in-
terest groups and judicial behavior, and add nuance to both. First, it is evident that
interest groups adjust their behavior to their political, institutional and advocacy
environment. Yet, the level and shape of influence of these factors has changed over
time, and is different within issue areas. Second, the ideological composition of groups
on opposing sides of the litigation provides not only influences the justices’ vote, but
its impact varies based on the side of the litigation it comes from, and the ideology of
the justice. Third, judicial behavior at the certiorari and merit stage are not entirely
independent, and is moderated by the influence of external actors.
The dissertation not only expands our knowledge on how and when interest groups
shape public policy, but also points the way to further research into how this collective
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behavior can exacerbate or ameliorate certain undemocratic feature of pluralism. We
know that ideology is one of the most salient predictors of political behavior, both
for the justices as well as interest groups (Schubert, 1965; Segal and Spaeth, 2002;
Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). Yet, on a large scale, we know very little about the
ideology of interest groups, the way it shapes their behavior, and how this impacts
the court’s decision-making process. This research provides a more complete picture
of judicial lobbying, conditional on group characteristics such as ideology and the issue
of concern, and its evolution overtime in correlation to the Supreme Court justices’
behavior.
In addition to the substantive contribution, the tools and mechanisms of network
analysis methodology lead the way to a better understanding of how information
flows between interest groups, and not just from them to political actors. The disser-
tation extends our knowledge of the mechanisms and particular qualities of interest
groups that are more conducive to influence on the judicial branch, and ultimately
shape public policy. I believe the outcome of this research adds more nuance to our
understanding of under which conditions interest group behavior shapes the court’s
decision-making processes and ultimately, its outcomes, and makes an important call
for future research on the conditional effects of interest group influence before the
Court, as well as on the other branches of government.
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Appendix A
Evolution of Interest Groups by Issue
Areas
A.1 Interest Group Density Over Time
In order to observe the evolution of groups by issue over the studied period, 1946-
2012, I segment the network into ten year periods starting in 1946. A visual inspection
of the networks is consistent with the measure of generalization for the multi-issue
groups. As the complexity of the questions presented before the court increased, and
the number of groups increased as well, there is a greater interconnectedness of groups
across issues.
(a) 1940 (b) 1950
Figure A·1: Amici Networks by Decade (Cont’d)
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(c) 1960 (d) 1970
(e) 1980 (f) 1990
(g) 2000 (h) 2010
Figure A·1: Amici Networks by Decade
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A.2 Interest Group Density by Issue Area
Segmenting the network by issue area reveals the differences in coalition behavior
across issues. For instance, it is evidence that issues with great group density such
as civil rights, first amendment, privacy, economic activity, and Federal Taxation
contain a major central cluster, indicating that groups are highly connected. In
contrast, issues with lower group density have multiple clusters. This shows that
beyond individual-level characteristics, the issue itself and the density of interest
populations can also influence the behavior of groups.
(a) Criminal (b) Civil Rights
(c) First Amendment (d) Due Process
Figure A·2: Amici Issue Networks (Cont’d)
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(e) Privacy (f) Official’s Compensation
(g) Union (h) Economic Activity
Figure A·2: Amici Issue Networks (Cont’d)
97
(i) Judicial Power (j) Federalims
(k) Federal Taxation (l) Miscellaneous
Figure A·2: Amici Issue Networks
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Appendix B
Interest Groups Ideological Composition
B.1 Logistic Regression for Justice’s Vote with a Scaled Ide-
ological Index
To further support the notion that a heterogenous is more likely to increase the
success of a coalition, It test a scaled version of the Ideological Cohesion Index.
In this instance, I constructed an index that ranges between 1-7, where each value
corresponds with the level of cohesion of the liberal supporting coalition versus the
conservative supporting coalition. The lowest value corresponds to the worst case
scenario for liberals, and 7 is best case scenario. As such:
• 1 = null amicus support for the liberal litigant versus heterogenous coalition in
support of the conservative litigant;
• 2 = cohesive coalition in support of the liberal litigant versus heterogenous
coalition in support of the conservative litigant;
• 3 = null amicus support for the liberal litigant versus cohesive coalition in
support of the conservative litigant;
• 4 = cohesive or heterogenous coalition in support of both litigants;
• 5 = cohesive coalition in support of the liberal litigant versus null amicus sup-
port for the conservative litigant;
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• 6 = heterogenous coalition in support of the liberal litigant versus cohesive
coalition in support of the conservative litigant;
• 7 = heterogenous coalition in support of the liberal litigant versus null amicus
support for the conservative litigant;
The results in Table B.1 are consistent with the main hypothesis, when litigants
are supported by an ideologically heterogenous coalition, it is more that they will
obtain a favorable vote from the justices. However, in contrast to the model in
Chapter 2, the ideological composition of amici coalition is equally significant for
both conservative and liberal litigants.
Table B.1: Logit Model, 1954-2012
Clustered SE
Ideological Heterogeneity Index 0.071∗∗∗ (0.019)
















Salience to the Public 0.130∗ (0.058)
Legal Salience −0.744∗∗∗ (0.071)









Writ of Certiorari, Amicus Briefs and
Judicial Behavior
C.1 Restricted Models of Judicial Behavior
Table C.1 presents the restricted models. Model 1C does not contain any of the amici
variables, and models 2C, 3C, and 4C contain model the opinion writing behavior
of justices accounting for each external measure of amici influence separately. As
shown in all four models, the control variables remain consistent in both restricted
and unrestricted models.
Table C.1: Logit Model, 1954-2012
Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C Model 4C
Ideological Distance 0.066∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.067∗∗
Legal Complexity 0.199∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.189∗∗
Legal Salience 0.245 0.255 0.243 0.248
Salience to the Public 0.572∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
Cooperation −0.104 −0.115 −105 −117
Freshman −0.521∗∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗
Chief Justice −0.825∗∗∗ −0.827∗∗∗ −0.827∗∗∗ −0.827∗∗∗
Writ for Other −0.294∗∗ −0.272∗∗ −0.292∗∗ −0.277∗∗
Writ for Conflict/Confusion −0.286∗∗ −0.261∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.274∗∗
Writ for Salient Question −0.116 −0.116 −0.116 −0.118
Justice’s Vote on Writ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗




AIC 8,198 8,186 8,198 8,189
Log Likelihood −4,068 −4,061 −4,067 −4,062
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
Standard errors adjusted for 797 clusters by case
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